“The Study of History lies at the foundation of all sound Military Conclusion & practice” (Alfred Thayer Mahan) 

Alfred Thayer Mahan, a U.S. naval officer and historian, was hailed by John Keegan as “the most important American strategist of the nineteenth century.” His seminal work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, garnered immediate acclaim, particularly in Europe. This was followed by The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812, which cemented his global prominence.

Mahan believed that national greatness was intrinsically linked to sea power, emphasizing its economic utility in peace and control during war. He utilized historical examples to support his beliefs, advocating that the education of naval officers should be grounded in a thorough study of history. Drawing on the principles of Jomini, Mahan stressed the importance of strategic locations such as choke points, canals, and coaling facilities, along with quantifiable levels of fighting power in a fleet.

He argued that in peacetime, states should enhance production and shipping capacities while acquiring overseas holdings. However, he emphasized that the number of coal fuelling stations and strategic sites should be limited to avoid overextending the mother country’s resources. Mahan posited that a navy’s primary duty was to secure command of the sea, ensuring its own sea communications while denying the adversary access to them and, if necessary, regulating neutral trade. Achieving control of the sea required destroying or neutralizing the enemy fleet rather than targeting commerce. This strategy called for a concentration of naval forces composed of numerous well-manned capital ships, operated on the principle that the best defense is a strong offensive.

Mahan also contended that naval dominance, even temporarily, could be crucial in supporting land forces. He envisioned a transnational consortium using naval power to defend a multinational free trade system. His pre-submarine era ideas slowed the adoption of convoys as a defensive measure against the German U-boat campaign in World War I. By the 1930s, the U.S. Navy had developed long-range submarines to attack Japanese ships. However, during World War II, the Imperial Japanese Navy, adhering to Mahan’s doctrines, used their submarines as fleet auxiliaries and failed to target American supply lines effectively.

Analyzing the Spanish-American War, Mahan noted the vast distances in the Pacific necessitated a battle fleet with long-range striking power. He believed that competent political and naval leadership were as crucial as geography in the development of sea power. His political analysis favored a transnational consortium over a single nation-state and aimed for free commerce rather than autarky. Mahan’s understanding of geography’s impact on strategy was tempered by his recognition of contingency’s role in shaping outcomes.

China’s Attraction to Mahan’s 

China’s naval establishment has long revered the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan. It is no exaggeration to say that no single thinker has had a greater influence on Chinese maritime policy since post-revolutionary China began focusing on the sea in the late twentieth century. However, this is changing. Chinese naval strategists are increasingly drawn to the works of British naval thinker Sir Julian Corbett. This shift reflects and promotes a significant change in Chinese grand strategy, with implications for the United States and the entire Indo-Pacific region.

Mahan’s primary arguments, while innovative in the nineteenth century, are relatively straightforward. He asserted that great nations, even innately insular ones like the United States, have crucial maritime interests ranging from coastal defense to the protection of major commerce routes. Consequently, every truly great power must safeguard its interests from potential threats. For Mahan, this meant that a powerful nation must control the world’s oceans. He argued that such dominance could only be achieved by decisively defeating the enemy’s major fleet in battle. Therefore, commerce raiding and other fragmented naval operations were distractions that could never be strategically decisive. The concentration of forces and what Mahan termed “offensive defense” were essential to achieving “command of the seas,” which he saw as the primary goal of great power naval strategy.

The reasons for Mahan’s popularity among both American and Chinese navalists are evident. Mahan wrote for and about a rising power, the United States, which was realizing the need to secure key maritime interests to prosper and fulfill its destiny as a great power. Initially, he believed these interests were concentrated in the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the sea lanes that would emerge with the opening of the Panama Canal. As his ideas evolved and U.S. interests extended beyond nearby waters, Mahan focused on the far seas, which he deemed critical to U.S. security and prosperity. This perspective appealed to American leaders such as President Theodore Roosevelt, who envisioned the United States as a true global superpower. Successive generations of American naval and political leaders saw that as the United States established itself as a global power, it required a navy capable of global operations.

Contemporary Chinese naval and political leaders are drawn to Mahan’s ideas for similar reasons. As market reforms spurred economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s, and China became more dependent on seaborne trade, Chinese officials recognized the importance of securing their maritime interests. Initially, these interests were framed in terms of China’s near seas: dominating the waters of the East and South China Seas, following a rough curve from Japan in the north, past Taiwan and the Philippines, down to Singapore and Malaysia, and preventing China from being hemmed in by the “First Island Chain.” Later, as China’s maritime trade routes globalized, Chinese naval strategists shifted their focus to the far seas, which were increasingly seen as vital to Chinese security and prosperity. Throughout these periods, Mahan’s works provided a conceptual foundation for considering the naval strategy best suited for a rising China. Although the Chinese naval establishment largely rejected Mahan’s ideas on decisive battles and removing the enemy fleet from the seas, they enthusiastically embraced his views on the necessity for a great power to have a navy capable of global operations.

Shift to Julian Corbett

Chinese naval strategists have inherited and adapted Mahan’s notion that a great state needs a fleet capable of seizing control of critical waterways and choke points from powerful adversaries, ensuring the security of global commerce on which its prosperity depends. They also internalized his view that a truly great power requires a truly powerful navy, capable of not just safeguarding its maritime interests but also projecting its influence globally. However, over the last decade or two, Chinese navalists have increasingly turned to the work of British naval historian Sir Julian Corbett.

Corbett agreed with Mahan on the importance of controlling vital sea channels for both military and commercial interests but differed on several key points. Most fundamentally, Corbett disagreed with Mahan’s near-exclusive emphasis on achieving ultimate dominance of the seas by annihilating the enemy’s naval might in decisive battles. Mahan’s basic idea of “naval strategy” was that comprehensive command of the seas was always the best method to achieve a great power’s broad strategic goals, accomplished by sweeping the enemy fleet away. Corbett, however, believed that each great power’s grand strategy necessitated a unique “maritime strategy.” While Mahan advocated for bringing the enemy’s main fleet to battle and destroying it in a decisive engagement, Corbett suggested that maritime strategy could also involve temporary and limited “control of the sea,” blockade, trade raiding and defense, or homeland defense, depending on the grand strategy being pursued. Corbett, like Clausewitz, believed that politics should always dictate military strategy, and that maritime policy should be based on a nation’s specific political goals, objectives, and limitations.

There are several reasons for Chinese navalists’ growing interest in Corbett’s work. Perhaps the most important cause has been a significant shift in China’s grand strategy over the last decade or so. For much of the post-revolutionary period, China’s strategy was one of geopolitical prudence, even isolationism, with priorities focused on defending the Chinese mainland, reintegrating lost territories, and pressing limited claims to disputed territories. However, in recent decades, China has effectively adopted a new grand strategy, best described as “offshore balancing.”

This strategy involves three main components:

1. Securing Land and Maritime Borders: China is committed to securing its borders, including sovereignty over the waters along the new ten dash line in the South China Sea, disputed territories along its boundary with India, islands claimed in the East China Sea, and Taiwan. This also includes preventing the United States from threatening the Chinese mainland or intervening in territorial disputes involving China.
2. Dominating Immediate Neighbors: China aims to dominate its immediate neighbors, both territorially contiguous ones (e.g., Nepal, Bhutan, and Vietnam) and those in the maritime region between its home waters and the Second Island Chain.
3. Maintaining a Favorable Balance of Power: China seeks to maintain a favorable balance of power as far afield as the Third Island Chain (encompassing Alaska, Hawaii, and New Zealand), the Fourth Island Chain (linking Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Diego Garcia), and the Fifth Island Chain (stretching from Djibouti to South Africa, including the Persian Gulf). In this context, a favorable balance of power is one that is not dominated by a single state but leans toward China, implying an unfavorable balance for the United States.

Corbett’s theories align well with this grand strategy, as they emphasize the need for a flexible maritime strategy tailored to specific political goals. For China, this means developing the capability to:

• Deter, Delay, and Weaken Potential U.S. Military Engagement: China aims to prevent, delay, and, if necessary, weaken any potential U.S. military involvement in maritime sovereignty issues or conflicts involving Taiwan. This strategy focuses on protecting China’s coastline and ports while establishing and defending sovereignty claims.
• Deny U.S. Command of the Seas: China seeks to deny the United States control over commercially and strategically important waterways and chokepoints. This requires maintaining a persistent maritime presence in strategic locations, even under hostile conditions and for extended periods.
• Counter India’s Naval Capabilities: China aims to prevent India from controlling or disrupting crucial sea routes and choke points leading to the Fifth Island Chain.

China has been implementing this maritime strategy for more than a decade. It has developed and deployed air, naval, and missile forces to create an anti-access/ area-denial (A2/AD) bubble encompassing the East China Sea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea, including its entire coastline and disputed islands. These forces include submarines, surface combatants, aircraft, anti-aircraft weapons, and anti-ship cruise missiles, supported by major naval bases in Qingdao, Ningbo, Zhanjiang, and Hainan Island, as well as installations in the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

Beyond these near seas defensive zone, China has deployed naval forces to dominate the seas up to the Second Island Chain. These forces include modern land-attack ballistic and cruise missiles capable of striking U.S. military sites on Okinawa and Guam, as well as anti-ship ballistic missiles with advanced re-entry vehicle technology, designed to deter, delay, and, if necessary, impair U.S. military operations, denying the U.S. control of the seas within the Second Island Chain.

China is also extending its reach beyond the Fifth Island Chain. It frequently deploys ships, including nuclear-powered submarines, in the Indian Ocean and surrounding areas, maintains a naval station in Djibouti, and controls port facilities in Hambantota, Sri Lanka, and Gwadar, Pakistan. Additionally, China reportedly has a military observation base on Myanmar’s Coco Islands in the Bay of Bengal, facilitating Chinese naval access to the Indian Ocean. Recently, China and Iran formed a strategic alliance, including joint training, research and weapon development, intelligence sharing, and Chinese investment in Iranian ports, adding to China’s “string of pearls.”

As China completes its offshore balancing infrastructure, Chinese carrier strike groups may begin to patrol the Indian Ocean regularly, challenging U.S. and allied naval dominance in the region. 

End Note

“Force is never more operative than what it is known to exist but is not brandished”

Alfred Thayer Mahan’s influence on maritime strategy, particularly in the context of the South China Sea, remains profound and enduring. Mahan, a prominent naval theorist of the late 19th century, emphasized the strategic significance of sea power in shaping global geopolitics. His ideas highlight the importance of controlling maritime routes and establishing naval dominance to secure national interests and global influence.

In the South China Sea, Mahan’s theories resonate deeply as nations vie for control over critical sea lanes and disputed territories rich in natural resources. Mahan’s concept of sea power has influenced modern maritime strategies in the region, prompting countries like China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and others to invest heavily in naval capabilities and infrastructure. China, in particular, has drawn from Mahan’s principles to assert its claims over almost the entire South China Sea. This has been achieved through a combination of naval expansion, island-building, and diplomatic maneuvering to strengthen its position. This strategy reflects Mahan’s emphasis on the strategic value of controlling key maritime chokepoints and establishing naval dominance to secure economic and military advantages.

Moreover, Mahan’s theories continue to shape international responses to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. The United States and its allies, adhering to Mahanian principles, have adopted strategies aimed at preserving freedom of navigation and countering China’s expansive claims through enhanced naval presence, multilateral partnerships, and support for regional allies. This approach underscores Mahan’s enduring relevance in contemporary naval doctrine, where the South China Sea has become a focal point of geopolitical competition and strategic maneuvering.

In essence, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s theories on sea power have profoundly influenced the strategic calculus in the South China Sea and continue to shape modern maritime strategies. His emphasis on naval dominance, control of maritime routes, and the strategic value of sea lanes remains pertinent as nations navigate complex geopolitical dynamics in one of the world’s most contested maritime regions. 

In an increasingly interconnected global landscape, regional conflicts reverberate far beyond their immediate theaters. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict has drawn significant attention and resources from Western powers, particularly the United States. Simultaneously, the Middle East simmers with volatility, with actors such as Israel, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis edging closer to war. In this turbulence, China sees opportunities to assert its dominance in the South China Sea (SCS), potentially destabilizing Southeast Asia and testing U.S. security commitments in the region.

The Middle Eastern Powder Keg

The Middle East, a region historically marked by geopolitical strife, finds itself at a critical crossroads. Since the surprise attack by Hamas on Israel on October 7, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has escalated dramatically. The situation is further complicated by the threat posed by Hezbollah in Lebanon, backed by Iran, to Israel’s northern settlements.

Meanwhile, the Houthis in Yemen, also backed by Iran, have disrupted maritime traffic in the Red Sea, adding another layer of complexity to the already volatile situation. With the prospect of war seeming imminent, Israel hopes for a swift victory through a blitzkrieg, but U.S. officials foresee a protracted conflict that could bog down the region and threaten long-term peace.

In light of these escalating tensions, the U.S. has offered significant assurances to Israel. Senior U.S. officials have reassured their Israeli counterparts that if a full-scale war breaks out on Israel’s northern border with Hezbollah, the Biden administration is fully prepared to back its ally. This assurance comes amidst increasing cross-border attacks between Israel and the Iran-backed Hezbollah, heightening fears of another full-fledged conflict in the Middle East.

However, U.S. officials have serious concerns that in the event of a full-blown war between Israel and Hezbollah, the Iran-backed militant group could overwhelm Israel’s air defenses in the north, including the Iron Dome system.

In recent meetings, U.S. and Israeli officials discussed potential “off-ramps” to de-escalate tensions along the Blue Line separating Lebanon and Israel.

The potential conflict in the Middle East also impacts U.S. strategic plans. While the U.S. has been attempting to pivot towards Asia, escalating tensions in the Middle East could hinder these efforts. The U.S. has been reshuffling its warship deployment in the region to maintain dominance, but a wider war in the Middle East could force the U.S. to focus more on this region, potentially affecting its strategic commitments elsewhere.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: A Preoccupation for the West

The conflict in Ukraine grinds on, marked by intense fighting as Ukrainian forces launch offensives to regain lost territory. Despite a recent peace summit in Switzerland, the path towards resolution remains daunting. The summit yielded a “Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework,” supported by a majority of attendees, pledging concrete steps on critical issues like nuclear threats, food security, and prisoner exchanges. However, Russia’s absence cast a long shadow, with its spokesman Dmitry Peskov dismissing the talks as irrelevant.

These developments highlight the conflict’s protracted nature and the difficulty of finding a solution without all parties at the table. The United States and its NATO allies have committed billions of dollars in aid and military support to Ukraine. As of mid-2024, the U.S. has provided over $40 billion in military assistance. This substantial investment indicates a preoccupation that might detract from the U.S.’s ability to respond robustly to crises elsewhere, particularly in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific region.

The South China Sea: A Brewing Storm

As the U.S. grapples with simultaneous conflicts in Ukraine and potentially the Middle East, China perceives a strategic window to advance its interests in the South China Sea. The sea is a crucial maritime route, vital for international trade and regional economies, particularly those of Southeast Asian nations like Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. China’s aggressive territorial claims and militarization of artificial islands have long been sources of regional tension.

Recently, China has ramped up its activities, including constructing military bases on disputed islands and increasing naval patrols. The U.S. has responded with freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) to assert the principle of international waters. However, with the U.S. potentially distracted, China might escalate its activities, pushing the boundaries of its influence and testing the resolve of Southeast Asian nations and their security alliances.

Implications for Southeast Asian Nations

The potential for increased Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS) poses significant risks for Southeast Asia. Economically, the region heavily relies on the stability of maritime routes for trade. Over $3.37 trillion worth of international trade passes through the SCS annually. Any disruption, such as those potentially caused by China’s growing assertiveness, could have cascading effects on global supply chains, impacting economies already strained by the pandemic.

Security-wise, Southeast Asian nations find themselves in an increasingly precarious position. The Philippines, a key U.S. ally, has experienced direct confrontations with Chinese vessels in its own Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In response to Chinese incursions, the Philippines has condemned China’s actions and asserted that such aggressive maneuvers will not prevent it from carrying out rotation and resupply missions to its troops in the West Philippine Sea. Philippine Former Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. called for stronger U.S. involvement back in 2021, stating, “We need the Americans. We need their presence in the South China Sea.” Today, the call for American presence in the South China Sea resonates even more powerfully, reflecting the escalating tension and the urgent need for stability in the region.

Moreover, China’s recent military exercises simulating an invasion of Taiwan have raised concerns about its intentions and the potential for escalation in the region. These exercises, which included mock missile strikes, have put Taiwan and other regional powers on high alert, highlighting the broader security implications of Chinese military assertiveness.

Similarly, Vietnam has fortified its own claims and sought closer security ties with the U.S. and other regional powers.  Its newly elected President To Lam is keen on gradually expanding security and defense relationships with the United States. The aim is to enhance collaboration in fields like cybersecurity, counter-terrorism, and combating transnational crimes. This move is a part of Vietnam’s strategic approach to maintain balanced relationships with the world’s major powers.

The web of alliances and rivalries in Southeast Asia means that any significant disruption in the South China Sea could lead to broader regional instability, with profound implications for both regional and global security.

U.S. Security Commitments: A Test of Resolve

The U.S. has long maintained a security presence in the Indo-Pacific, highlighted by its alliances with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and its strategic partnerships with nations like Singapore and Vietnam. However, the strain of managing conflicts on multiple fronts—Ukraine, potentially the Middle East, and then in the South China Sea—could test American resolve and capability.

The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, however, emphasizes a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” with commitments to deter aggression and maintain regional stability. Yet, a perceived or actual reduction in U.S. military presence and engagement in Southeast Asia could embolden China, altering the regional balance of power. Admiral John C. Aquilino, commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, has stressed the importance of maintaining U.S. presence, stating, “The security environment is becoming more complex, and we must be prepared to respond to threats in multiple theaters” .

The viewpoint of the U.S. public towards foreign interventions is a crucial factor. Recent polls indicate a growing reluctance among Americans towards military involvement abroad. If this sentiment continues to intensify, it could influence U.S. strategic considerations. The impact of this domestic pressure on the U.S.’s determination to uphold its security commitments in the Indo-Pacific and the Arab world remains to be seen.

 China’s Strategic Calculus

China is likely to perceive the U.S.’s preoccupation with other global conflicts as an opportune moment to consolidate its position in the SCS. Beijing has historically sought to avoid direct military confrontation with the U.S., opting instead for incremental gains through strategic maneuvers. Should the U.S. appear overstretched, China might intensify its activities in the SCS, including more aggressive patrolling, establishing further military outposts, and pressuring Southeast Asian nations diplomatically and economically.

Yan Xuetong, a prominent Chinese scholar of international relations, asserts that China’s strategy aims to secure regional dominance and protect maritime interests. He advocates for enhancing “comprehensive national power” through a balanced approach: strengthening control over the SCS while avoiding direct conflict with the U.S. This strategy combines military readiness with diplomatic engagement to manage tensions without provoking a full-scale confrontation.

Diplomatic engagement plays a crucial role in China’s strategy. Beijing seeks to divide and weaken the unified stance of ASEAN countries by offering economic incentives to some while isolating more vocal opponents like Vietnam and the Philippines. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) exemplifies this, as Beijing leverages economic investments to expand its influence across Southeast Asia. Nations such as Cambodia and Laos, heavily reliant on Chinese investments, might find it challenging to oppose Chinese ambitions in the SCS. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian has reiterated China’s stance, asserting, “China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and their adjacent waters”.

China’s diplomatic efforts are complemented by its participation in regional forums and international organizations, where it aims to shape the narrative and build support for its claims. This multifaceted approach allows China to advance its strategic objectives while managing the risks of direct confrontation. As the U.S. navigates conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, China’s opportunity to consolidate SCS claims heightens, reshaping Southeast Asia’s geopolitical dynamics.

End Note

The web of global geopolitics suggests that a wider conflict in the Middle East would have profound implications beyond its immediate vicinity, potentially destabilizing Southeast Asia and altering the strategic dynamics of the South China Sea. For Southeast Asian nations, the challenge lies in understanding this complex landscape, balancing their security needs with economic realities. For the U.S., maintaining its security commitments in the Indo-Pacific while addressing crises elsewhere will be a formidable test of its global leadership and strategic resilience. As the world watches developments in the Middle East, the stakes for Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region cannot be overstated.

Japan is engaging in a significant strategic endeavor: constructing artificial islands. This island nation, long shaped by the tectonic forces at the convergent plate boundary, is now using human ingenuity to enhance its geopolitical and economic standing. The move is not just about expanding territory but also about fortifying its position in a region rife with tension and uncertainty.

Historical Relationship Between China, Taiwan, and Japan

The complex relationship between China (officially the People’s Republic of China, PRC) and Taiwan (officially the Republic of China, ROC) is central to understanding the broader regional dynamics. Following Japan’s defeat in World War II, Taiwan was transferred from Japanese control to the Republic of China in 1945. This handover was formalized under the Treaty of San Francisco, although some legal ambiguities regarding the treaty’s wording persist.

The Chinese Civil War, which saw the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) defeat the Kuomintang (KMT) forces, resulted in the ROC government retreating to Taiwan in 1949. This established Taipei as the ROC’s temporary capital, while Beijing became the capital of the newly founded People’s Republic of China. Since then, no formal peace treaty has been signed, leaving the civil war technically unresolved.

Early cross-strait relations were marked by military skirmishes and diplomatic battles as both governments claimed to be the legitimate ruler of China. The situation began to evolve following Taiwan’s democratization in the 1990s. Today, the debate centers on whether Taiwan should pursue formal independence or seek unification with the PRC under a “one country, two systems” framework. Beijing continues to claim Taiwan as part of its territory and vehemently opposes any moves toward Taiwanese independence.

In 2008, talks resumed to reopen the “Three Links”—trade, transit, and postal services—that had been severed since 1949. This period also saw increased non-governmental and semi-governmental interactions between Taipei and Beijing, although formal diplomatic exchanges remain contentious and largely dependent on the political party in power in Taiwan.

Shifting gears, now let’s turn to Japan. Understanding Japan’s historical relationship with Taiwan and its current strategic interests in the region is crucial to comprehending why Japan is actively building islands, particularly near Taiwan.

Japan’s historical ties with Taiwan date back to the 16th century. In 1592, during the Sengoku period, Japanese warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi sent an envoy to Taiwan, then known as Takasago Koku. The bilateral economic ties persisted through Dutch colonial rule and the Tungning Kingdom of Taiwan in the 17th century. Japan’s Meiji Restoration in the late 19th century reignited its expansionist ambitions, culminating in Taiwan becoming a Japanese colony in 1895 after the First Sino-Japanese War. This colonial period ended with Japan’s defeat in World War II and Taiwan’s return to Chinese control.

Despite the end of official diplomatic relations following the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué, which recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China, Taiwan and Japan maintain robust non-governmental interactions. These include significant economic and cultural exchanges, reflecting a complicated yet enduring relationship.

Geopolitical Significance of Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region

Taiwan’s strategic location in the Indo-Pacific makes it a pivotal player in regional geopolitics. The island nation sits at the crossroads of the South China Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the Indian Ocean. This advantageous position has made Taiwan a focal point in the power dynamics between the US and China, particularly as Beijing intensifies its military activities and aggressive rhetoric towards the island.

The Indo-Pacific region has become the center of global strategic interest, with major powers like China, the US, Japan, Australia, and India vying for influence. China’s assertive territorial claims in the East and South China Seas have led to numerous disputes with neighboring countries, including Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan. These tensions have prompted other regional powers to bolster their presence and support stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Taiwan’s strategic significance is further underscored by its role in global supply chains, particularly in semiconductor manufacturing. The island is home to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world’s largest contract chipmaker. In 2022, TSMC and other Taiwanese firms accounted for over 60% of global semiconductor production, supplying essential components for everything from smartphones to advanced military systems. This dominance has made Taiwan a crucial player in the global tech industry and a key partner for the US and other advanced economies.

The US has taken significant steps to reduce its dependency on Taiwanese semiconductors, recognizing the strategic risks involved. The CHIPS Act, passed in 2022, aims to bolster domestic chip production, including financial support for TSMC’s new facility in Arizona, set to begin operations in 2025. Concurrently, the Biden administration has imposed strict export controls to limit China’s access to advanced semiconductors, further escalating the technological competition between Washington and Beijing.

Recent Tensions Between China and Taiwan

Despite escalating tensions, Taiwan remains a global leader in semiconductor manufacturing, producing over 60% of the world’s semiconductors in 2022. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) plays a pivotal role in this industry, supplying critical components to major tech firms like Apple. This dominance in chip manufacturing has drawn the attention of global powers, with the US seeking to bolster its own semiconductor industry in response to its reliance on Taiwanese production.

The growing hostilities between China and Taiwan have profound implications for global economies and supply chains. The Biden administration’s efforts to restrict China’s access to advanced chips, coupled with support for TSMC’s expansion in the US, highlight the strategic importance of securing semiconductor supply chains amid growing tensions with China.

China’s aggressive tactics towards Taiwan have included economic pressure and military intimidation, particularly since the election of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leader Tsai Ing-Wen as president in 2016. Beijing’s assertiveness was further underscored by President Xi Jinping’s announcement on October 8, 2021, of China’s potential “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan. This statement came on the heels of a record number of Chinese military aircraft entering Taiwan’s defense zone.

The geopolitical significance of Taiwan is also reflected in its advanced defense capabilities. Taiwan’s deep-water naval bases on the east coast, such as Su’ao and Hualien, allow submarines to enter the Pacific Ocean undetected, highlighting the island’s strategic value to Beijing. The heightened activity of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) around Taiwan underscores China’s commitment to reunification, with military maneuvers increasingly testing Taiwan’s defenses.

In 2024, Lai Ching-te, also known as William Lai, is set to assume the presidency of Taiwan, continuing the DPP’s governance for a third consecutive term. This unprecedented political continuity signifies strong public support for Taiwan’s current trajectory, despite the ongoing threats from Beijing. The international community closely watches these developments, considering the implications for regional stability and global geopolitical dynamics.

Japan’s Concerns and Strategic Interests

Japan, while not a direct participant in the South China Sea disputes, has significant interests in maintaining stability in the region. The South China Sea is a critical corridor for global trade, and any disruption could have severe economic repercussions for Japan. Furthermore, Japan faces direct security threats from North Korea’s missile program and its territorial disputes with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

Japan’s approach to the South China Sea issue is heavily influenced by its security alliance with the United States. This alliance, while providing a strategic buffer, also subjects Japan to the vicissitudes of US foreign policy. Tokyo’s challenge is to balance its dependency on US military support with its need to assert its own strategic interests in the region.

For Japan, maintaining a balance of power in this region is crucial to its national security and economic stability. Japan’s construction of artificial islands can therefore be viewed as a strategic move to bolster its maritime presence and secure its interests in the Indo-Pacific. These islands serve multiple purposes, from enhancing military capabilities to securing vital sea lanes and supporting economic activities.

Japan’s regional strategy also involves deepening ties with other key players in the Indo-Pacific, including Australia, India, and Southeast Asian nations. These partnerships are crucial for Japan to build a coalition that can effectively counterbalance China’s growing assertiveness. Japan’s efforts to align its Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision with ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific Outlook demonstrate its commitment to regional diplomacy and multilateral cooperation. This initiative reflects Japan’s proactive approach to addressing the geopolitical challenges of the 21st century.

The Evolving Defense Posture of Japan’s Nansei Islands

A significant shift in defense strategy emerged during the recent “2-plus-2” negotiations between the foreign and defense ministers of Japan and the United States. Held in Washington, this summit marked a pivotal moment in fortifying the defense of Japan’s Nansei Islands, highlighting the growing concerns over potential threats from China and the vulnerability of Taiwan.

The New Marine Littoral Regiment

Okinawa Prefecture is set to host a U.S. Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), a unit specially designed to rapidly respond to emergencies on Japan’s outlying islands. This decision reflects the increasing anxiety over Taiwan’s security. The MLR, expected to be operational by 2025, will consist of approximately 1,800 to 2,000 troops equipped with anti-aircraft missiles and long-range anti-ship capabilities. This regiment will be highly maneuverable, capable of dispersing into smaller units to defend isolated islands, disrupt enemy operations, and control nearby waters.

Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada emphasized the importance of enhancing the alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities. “This effort will significantly strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities,” he declared at a joint press conference. “We came to the conclusion that, in order to assume the fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s defense capabilities, a division of roles and missions must be realized.”

The transformation of the Marine Corps regiment in Okinawa is a key element of this strategy. This change is part of a broader realignment that includes reducing heavy equipment to create a more agile force. The first MLR was established in Hawaii in March 2022, with plans for a third regiment likely to be stationed in Guam. This positioning is crucial given China’s “anti-access/area-denial” strategy, which aims to restrict U.S. forces’ access to critical regions in the western Pacific.

Enhancing Japan’s Self-Defense Forces

Parallel to these developments, Japan is enhancing its own Self-Defense Forces (SDF). The Ground Self-Defense Force’s 15th Brigade in Naha is slated to expand into a division, increasing its personnel from approximately 2,200 to 3,000. This upgrade is part of the Defense Buildup Program, which aims to make eight divisions, five brigades, and other units more mobile and capable of quick deployment to the Nansei Islands.

Transport and logistics are also being prioritized. Plans include forming a transport ship unit and increasing the number of aircraft and transport ships. Additionally, the government is advancing the construction of supply bases and weapon storage facilities in the Nansei region, a move that the U.S. military has long advocated to ensure a robust supply chain for continuous SDF operations.

Community Impact and Local Concerns

Amid these strategic preparations, local communities, particularly on Yonaguni Island, are grappling with the implications. Known for its idyllic beaches and unique wildlife, Yonaguni is now at the forefront of regional tensions due to its proximity to Taiwan, only 110 kilometers away. The Japanese government has announced plans to expand the island’s airport and port, as well as the SDF facilities. In April, it was also declared that underground shelters would be constructed for evacuees on Yonaguni and other frontline islands.

Residents like Shoko Komine, who runs a local restaurant, express their concerns about being drawn into a potential conflict. “Of course I’m worried about something happening with Taiwan,” she says. “I believe Yonaguni may be drawn into a dispute with China and Taiwan if it arises.”

Constructing Underground Shelters

In response to these concerns, the government released guidelines for constructing subterranean bunkers on Okinawa Prefecture’s outlying islands. These shelters, to be built in public facilities, are designed to protect residents during a Taiwan-related military conflict. They will be equipped with reinforced concrete walls and stocked with supplies sufficient for at least two weeks. However, the mayors of some isolated islands have voiced their dissatisfaction, fearing that these preparations might increase the likelihood of their communities being targeted in the event of Chinese aggression.

Okinawa Governor Denny Tamaki has called for diplomatic measures to ensure peace, reflecting on the devastating toll of the Battle of Okinawa in 1945. “I want to ask the central government for an explanation about how it plans to take steps to ensure peace, rather than just work on the assumption that bases and underground shelters should come first,” Tamaki stated.

Balancing Preparedness and Diplomacy

Japan’s strategy underscores a delicate balance between preparedness and diplomacy. The construction of underground shelters on islands like Ishigaki, Miyakojima, Yonaguni, Taketomi, and Tarama is part of a comprehensive approach to safeguarding citizens and maintaining regional stability. These shelters are designed not only for military crises but also to serve as evacuation centers during natural disasters and as community spaces in peacetime.

Experts like Ken Jimbo, an international security professor at Tokyo’s Keio University, support the government’s strategy. He highlights the increasing awareness of a potential military clash over Taiwan. However, Jimbo also cautions that crisis management plans must consider the severe impact a full-scale Chinese invasion of Taiwan would have.

End Note

Japan’s proactive approach reflects its commitment to integrating emergency infrastructure into daily life, thereby strengthening community resilience. By balancing defense measures with diplomatic efforts, Japan aims to deter aggression while promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region. This comprehensive strategy not only enhances the protection of its citizens but also underscores Japan’s dedication to harmonious international relations.