Geo-Politics

How China’s ‘Salami Slicing’ Tactics Spark South China Sea Tensions | U.S. vs. China

Sixty percent of the world population inhabits the Indo-Pacific region, and all the essential trade routes to the countries of the region have to pass through the South China Sea. Serving as the jugular vein for many of the world’s largest economies, the South China Sea has managed to garner the attention of major powers for decades. Abundant in hydrocarbon reserves and marine life, these waters are critical beyond boundaries. However, the potential geopolitical value of the South China Sea can be better understood if we estimate the value of trade that passes through its routes.

Geopolitical Significance by Trade Value

According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, nearly eighty percent of the world trade by volume and seventy percent by value happens via waterways. Of that volume, sixty percent of the maritime global trade has to pass through Asia, with South China waters providing passageways for one-third of all the shipments.

Several articles on the South China Sea have quoted that more than five trillion dollars worth of trade happens through its waters yearly. Out of those, 1.2 trillion dollars have been estimated to be the United States’ earnings alone. Despite changes in world trade over the last decade, these figures have been frequently quoted since 2010.

Why the Tensions?

In researching the ongoing clashes in the region, you might come across a term: the Exclusive Economic Zones. Measured in nautical miles, the exclusive economic zones of a country refer to the territories under its legal jurisdiction, as approved by international law.

In the vast expanse of the South China Sea, numerous nations, such as China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea, each possess their distinct economic domains. These sovereign entities heavily rely upon the strategic waterway known as the Strait of Malacca for the transportation and reception of their cargo shipments. This maritime passageway has earned the reputation of a pivotal trade constriction point, as it serves as the connective conduit between the expansive Indian Ocean, the vast Pacific Ocean, and the sprawling South China Sea. In short, one can say this passageway connects the vital arteries of trade in Southeast Asia.

Why is it Important for China?

The South China Sea is a paramount maritime junction for trade for several giant economies, such as Japan and China. In fact, if you look at China’s economic landscape, you will clearly see how the country depends on the South China Sea. With 60 percent of its trade happening through waters, the country’s economic security is substantially based on the shipments through these waters.

Considering China’s high dependency on water routes, overwhelming apprehensions have arisen among the international media, scholars, and governments. Various global entities were concerned that China’s growing regional influence may embolden Beijing to disrupt commercial shipping and precipitate a worldwide economic crisis.

In 2003, the country’s then-President Hu Jintao drew his administration’s attention to a potential threat posed by ‘major powers’ that aimed to dominate the Strait of Malacca. The president had emphasized the need for China to curate strategies to address the threat.

China’s Salami-Slicing Tactics

Since then, the Chinese administration has emphasized the need to solve this “Malacca Dilemma” by exploring alternative shipping routes. However, Beijing has used several other approaches to preserve its free flow of trade: the salami-slicing tactics. No, we do not mean meat chopping. Instead, we are referring to the clever, repetitive, limited faits accomplis used by expansionist powers to expand their influence while avoiding potential escalation. Salami tactics involve a series of small actions, like slicing a salami, taken in a way that makes it difficult for others to respond effectively.

Given that national security is no longer about territorial defenses, practicing maximum control over the sea will give the country a lot of power over the other economies, including its neighbors.

China has been using a salami-slicing military strategy in the South China Sea for a long time. Over decades, the country has claimed multiple portions of the sea, little by little, often infuriating its neighbors. China’s encroachments have posed serious problems for their economies as they rely on the sea for their maritime trade.

The Philippines

Sometime around mid-September, the Philippines brought international attention to the extensive damage to its marine ecosystem in the Sabina Shoal due to the presence of Chinese vessels in the territory. Pressing officials accused China of immense devastation, and the Philippine Coast Guard even shared detailed footage of vast patches of broken and bleached coral.

Only a few weeks later, the Manila Coast Guard reported the presence of a floating barrier placed by the Chinese Coast Guard around Bajo de Masinloc, Panatag Shoal. The Philippine government ordered its military to launch a covert operation and have the barrier removed. The shoal lies within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone slightly west of Luzon Island. Beijing has been occupying it since 2012 as an attempt to assert dominance over nearly the entire South China Sea. The Chinese barrier had been preventing a swarm of Filipino vessels from entering the rich fishing area. According to the Philippine Coast Guard, the Chinese Coast Guard vessels laid the rope and net barrier, held up by buoys, and more than 50 Philippine fishing boats swarmed outside the shoal. After the orders of the Philippine President, the rope and net barrier were dismantled, and the Filipino fishing boats entered the shallow lagoon and caught about 164 tons of fish in one day. It is not the first and only incident of fishermen suffering due to aggressive Chinese maneuvers within its neighbor’s exclusive economic waters.

A ’10-Dash Line’ Map

The People’s Republic of China asserts an inherent and historical claim over almost the entire South China Sea. In August, Beijing released a new national map featuring a U-shaped dash line that crosses exclusive economic zones of the countries, including Vietnam, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei. The map was quite similar to its map in 1948. The said line also covers the entire Spratly Islands, including the Kalayaan Islands of the Philippines.

To solidify its claims over most of the South China Sea, China has not only released maps conceiving its rule over various islands but also occupied them. It is an attempt to change the status quo gradually, aka salami slicing.

Accession of Islands and Corals

The 1970s saw China take over Vietnam’s Paracel Islands. In 1995, the country occupied the Mischief Reef claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines. And in 2012, it gained control over the Scarborough Shoal of the Philippines.

The US became concerned when China started building on these islands. The US imports most of its advanced microchips from Taiwan through the South China Sea. Roughly fourteen percent of America’s shipments come from this passageway. Hence, in 2015, it prompted President Jinping to make an assurance. “We are committed to maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea, and China doesn’t intend to pursue militarization,” President Xi Jinping stated, addressing a public press conference.

Shortly afterward, the People’s Republic of China broke its promise. Today, it has twenty outposts in the Paracel Islands and seven in Spratly. Several of these islands have aircraft hangers, missiles, military jamming equipment, and other advanced systems. Throughout the process, many US officials expressed concern and told the Chinese government repeatedly that they were making a mistake. This process drove many countries in the region closer to the US military and damaged Beijing’s ties with Washington.

In 2016, the Philippines brought China to an international tribunal over its accession of the Filipino territories. The tribunal at The Hague ruled that China’s claims were illegal and the islands that it built would not expand its exclusive economic zone. The Philippines won, but China boycotted and refused to recognize the ruling. The United States stood by the Philippines, declaring this action directly threatened the peace and stability in the region.

Washington’s Strategy

Washington has planned to counter Beijing’s salami-slicing in two ways: by boosting its military presence and strengthening bilateral relations with other nations in the area.

In October, the Philippines is anticipated to host a yearly joint military exercise with the US. The two countries have been mutual defense allies since the 1950s, which means if one of them gets attacked, the other has to come to its aid. In 2014, Manila and Washington signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Under the agreement, the Philippines gave the US access to five of its military bases where the country could build infrastructure and rotate troops. However, the two countries’ ties have been subjected to conflicts. Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who took office last year, the Philippines has tried to nurture normal ties with China. But his stance contrasts with that of Rodrigo Duterte, his predecessor, who nurtured warm ties with China and Russia while often criticizing the US. Therefore, the two countries have planned one of the largest military drills of decades for this year. China’s foreign ministry has criticized the act globally and stated that such exercises might endanger peace and harmony in the region. There is a struggle and geopolitical competition between China and the US. Experts from China’s neighboring countries think that the country is violating its sovereign rights.

The United States also carries out various freedom of navigation operations in Southeast Asia. By demonstrating that it can fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, these US operations are meant to challenge excessive maritime claims. However, China considers these operations illegal. Yet, the US managed to strengthen its military alliance with the nations in the region. It has also encouraged some of them to run patrols through the South China Sea.

Vietnam

In a recent call with Nguyen Phu Trong, Vietnam’s General Secretary, US President Joe Biden discussed how to maintain an unrestricted Indo-Pacific.

It might be important to note that Vietnam has long-standing bilateral relations with China. The ties between the two countries are crucial to the country’s economic growth. However, there have been times when Vietnam has faced challenges operating in its own exclusive economic zones due to China’s salami-slicing operations in the South China Sea. For instance, in 2019, China sent a survey ship to conduct four seismic surveys within 200 nautical miles of Vietnam. At the same time, a Chinese Coast Guard Vessel harassed a Japanese vessel chartered by a Vietnamese joint venture with Russia in waters about 190 miles southeast of Vietnam.

These are not standalone acts. In fact, these are among several of China’s maritime disputes that have enabled the United States to strengthen its ties with yet another country in the region.

“We greatly value the relationships we have with all of these countries in the region. And, there’s one constant among all of them. And that is, we respect their sovereignty. That is where the PRC, I believe, is missing the mark because they want to operate on their own set of rules and not respect the sovereignty of the other existing nations in the region,” a US Army Official stated.

Presently, Chinese diplomats engage in deliberations with their counterparts from the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia, with the primary objective of mitigating the prevailing tensions within the South China Sea. The establishment of a legally enforceable protocol governing interactions between China and its Southeast Asian counterparts has been perceived as a viable mechanism to avert prospective conflicts. Nonetheless, it is imperative to acknowledge that such dialogues have persisted over decades, with the outcomes thus far remaining disappointingly minimal.

Analysis

Who Own Pedra Branca?

Who Own Pedra Branca? Territorial disputes, often driven by historical claims, strategic importance, and natural resources, are a global issue, as demonstrated by conflicts like the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands dispute involving China, Japan, and Taiwan, and the Kuril Islands dispute between Japan and Russia. These islands, rich in resources and strategically located, are contested for both economic and geopolitical reasons.

In northwest Africa, the Western Sahara conflict continues between Morocco and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), with Morocco controlling most of the territory and the SADR pushing for independence. The Israel-Palestine conflict, one of the most enduring and deeply rooted disputes, is driven by complex historical, religious, and political tensions over the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. In contrast, the Hans Island dispute between Denmark and Canada has taken on a lighthearted tone, symbolized by the “whisky war” of leaving national spirits on the contested island.

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Similarly, the Pedra Branca dispute between Singapore and Malaysia is significant because of the strategic maritime locations. Though resolved by the International Court of Justice in 2008, ongoing negotiations over further maritime boundaries highlight the challenges of settling territorial disputes even after legal rulings. Let us get a glimpse of this issue:

Background Information

Pedra Branca is a small yet strategically important island situated at the eastern entrance of the Singapore Strait, about 24 nautical miles from mainland Singapore and close to the Malaysian state of Johor. Home to the Horsburgh Lighthouse, built by the British in the mid-19th century, the island also houses a military rebroadcast station, a helipad, a desalination plant, and a communications tower. Its position at the crossroads of major shipping routes pinpoints its value, making Pedra Branca a key asset for navigation and maritime security in one of the busiest waterways in the world.

The island’s strategic importance lies in its location within the Singapore Strait, a critical artery that connects the Strait of Malacca to the South China Sea. Control over Pedra Branca provides the ability to monitor maritime traffic in this economically vital route, which is essential for global trade, especially for oil shipments and other key goods. Recent land reclamation efforts by Singapore aim to improve its facilities, including the addition of berthing spaces and logistical support, further enhancing the island’s role in ensuring safe navigation through these busy waters.

Pedra Branca has been the center of a long-standing territorial dispute between Singapore and Malaysia. The conflict began in 1979 when Malaysia claimed the island as part of its territory. Singapore formally protested, citing historical records and continuous administration since the British colonial period. The case went to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which ruled in 2008 that Pedra Branca belonged to Singapore, while nearby Middle Rocks were awarded to Malaysia. Although the ruling clarified ownership, the issue remains sensitive, with Malaysia recently revisited the case through a royal commission of inquiry.

Historical Claims

Malaysia’s claim to Pedra Branca, or Pulau Batu Puteh as it is known locally, is rooted in the historical sovereignty of the Johor Sultanate. Malaysia argues that the island was part of Johor’s territory long before the British colonial period and that it was never formally ceded to any foreign power. Upon gaining independence, Malaysia believes it inherited this sovereignty. To support its claim, Malaysia references historical navigational charts and maps from the 19th century, which it asserts depict Pedra Branca as part of Johor, along with accounts of local fishermen using the island.

Singapore’s claim is based on the principle of effective occupation and administration. Singapore contends that the British colonial government took possession of Pedra Branca in the mid-19th century to construct the Horsburgh Lighthouse, completed in 1851. Since then, Singapore has continuously administered the island, maintaining the lighthouse and establishing additional infrastructure, including a military rebroadcast station, a helipad, and a desalination plant. Singapore highlighted its consistent governance, controlling access to the island and overseeing its upkeep as evidence of effective control.

The territorial dispute between Malaysia and Singapore reached the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which in 2008 ruled in favor of Singapore’s sovereignty over Pedra Branca. However, in 2017, Malaysia attempted to reopen the case, citing newly discovered documents from British archives. This effort was later withdrawn in 2018, leaving the ICJ’s original judgment unchanged. Despite the finality of the ruling, the issue remains a sensitive and ongoing point of contention between the two nations.

The Dispute

The Pedra Branca dispute began in 1979 when Malaysia published a map, known as the “1979 Map,” which included Pedra Branca within its territorial waters. This marked a departure from previous understandings and formalized Malaysia’s claim to the island, which it considered part of the Johor Sultanate’s historical territory. The publication of the map triggered the onset of the territorial conflict between Malaysia and Singapore, with Malaysia asserting ownership over the strategically located island.

In response, Singapore lodged a formal protest in February 1980, rejecting Malaysia’s claim and requesting the correction of the map. Singapore based its argument on historical records and its continuous administration of the island since the mid-19th century, when the British constructed the Horsburgh Lighthouse. Diplomatic exchanges between the two nations followed, with both sides presenting evidence to support their claims, but these early efforts did not lead to a resolution. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the dispute fueled increased diplomatic tensions as both nations maintained their respective positions.

Despite several rounds of bilateral negotiations from 1993 to 1994, Malaysia and Singapore failed to reach a consensus on the ownership of Pedra Branca. In 1998, both countries agreed to submit the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for a binding resolution. A formal Special Agreement was signed in 2003, setting the terms for the court proceedings. After hearings in 2007, the ICJ delivered its judgment in May 2008, ruling in favor of Singapore, thereby resolving the long-standing dispute over Pedra Branca.

Aftermath and Current Status

Following the ICJ’s 2008 ruling, both Singapore and Malaysia took peaceful steps to implement the decision. Singapore continued its administration of Pedra Branca, enhancing infrastructure such as the Horsburgh Lighthouse, a desalination plant, and a military rebroadcast station. Meanwhile, Malaysia adjusted its maritime boundaries in accordance with the ruling and took control of Middle Rocks. Although Malaysia sought to revise the judgment in 2018 citing new evidence, it eventually withdrew its appeal, with Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim recently affirming that while Malaysia disagrees with the ICJ’s decision, it respects the ruling and will not pursue further appeals.

Currently, Pedra Branca remains under Singapore’s administration, with significant facilities like the Horsburgh Lighthouse, a helipad, a desalination plant, and a communications tower located on the island. Singapore has also initiated land reclamation projects aimed at improving maritime safety and security, expanding search and rescue capabilities, and providing berthing facilities for vessels.

Despite the resolution of the sovereignty dispute, the delimitation of maritime boundaries around Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge remains an ongoing issue. Both nations are negotiating these boundaries through the Malaysia-Singapore Joint Technical Committee, although overlapping territorial waters and the area’s strategic importance complicate the process.

Conclusion

The Pedra Branca dispute, a complex and long-standing territorial conflict between Singapore and Malaysia, highlight the strategic importance of this small island at the crossroads of major shipping routes. The International Court of Justice’s 2008 ruling in favor of Singapore, while resolving the primary issue of sovereignty, has not entirely quelled the sensitivities surrounding the matter, as evidenced by Malaysia’s subsequent attempts to revisit the case. The peaceful resolution through legal means, facilitated by ASEAN’s diplomatic efforts, highlights the potential for international law to address and settle regional disputes.

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Analysis

Who Own Ligitan and Sipadan Islands?

Territorial disputes can ignite tensions and reshape geopolitical landscapes, as seen in various high-stakes conflicts worldwide. For instance, the Pedra Branca case between Singapore and Malaysia concluded in an International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling that awarded the island to Singapore, while nearby Middle Rocks were granted to Malaysia. Similarly, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands remain a contentious point between Japan and China, with both nations fiercely asserting their claims over these strategically significant islands.

The Falkland Islands dispute, which erupted into war between the United Kingdom and Argentina in 1982, continues to highlight the unresolved sovereignty issues. Against this backdrop, the dispute over Ligitan and Sipadan Islands between Indonesia and Malaysia was settled by the ICJ in 2002, which ruled in favor of Malaysia based on its effective occupation and administration of the islands. This landmark decision not only resolved a long-standing conflict but also emphasized the importance of legal frameworks in settling territorial disagreements.

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Background Information

Ligitan and Sipadan are two small but significant islands located in the Celebes Sea, off the southeastern coast of the Malaysian state of Sabah. These islands were once the center of a territorial dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia, which was ultimately resolved by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2002. The ICJ awarded sovereignty over both islands to Malaysia, based on the principle of “effective occupation,” recognizing Malaysia’s consistent administration of the islands.

Ligitan Island, while less developed than its counterpart, is known for its rich marine biodiversity. It serves primarily as a site for scientific research and conservation efforts, playing a crucial role in preserving the region’s ecological balance. In contrast, Sipadan Island has gained international fame for its exceptional scuba diving opportunities. Rising 600 to 700 meters from the seabed, this oceanic island is renowned for its vibrant marine life, including turtles, sharks, and diverse coral reefs, making it one of the world’s premier diving destinations.

Both islands are situated within the Celebes Sea, a major body of water in the western Pacific Ocean. Bordered by the Sulu Archipelago and Sulu Sea to the north, the Philippine island of Mindanao to the northeast, the Sangihe Islands to the east, Sulawesi (Celebes) to the south, and Borneo to the west, the Celebes Sea covers a vast area of approximately 110,000 square miles. Known for its deep waters, with depths reaching up to 6,220 meters, the sea is both an important geographical feature and a hub of marine biodiversity in Southeast Asia.

II. Historical Claims

Indonesia and Malaysia both laid historical claims to the Ligitan and Sipadan Islands, which culminated in a territorial dispute that was ultimately resolved by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2002. Each country’s claim was rooted in different interpretations of historical treaties and activities in the region.

Indonesia’s Claim

Indonesia’s claim to Ligitan and Sipadan was primarily based on the 1891 Convention between Great Britain and the Netherlands, which established the 4 degree 10 minute north parallel of latitude as the dividing line between British and Dutch territories in the region. According to Indonesia, the islands, located south of this parallel, should have been considered part of the Dutch East Indies, and therefore, belong to Indonesia as its successor state. Additionally, Indonesia cited historical presence and activities in the surrounding waters, such as the presence of Indonesian fishermen and administrative actions. However, these activities were not consistently documented, nor as continuous as those put forward by Malaysia.

Malaysia’s Claim

Malaysia, on the other hand, based its claim on the principle of “effective occupation,” which became a decisive factor in the ICJ’s ruling. Malaysia argued that it had administered the islands through its predecessor, Great Britain, and continued that administration following independence. Malaysia presented evidence of its longstanding involvement, including the establishment of a bird sanctuary on Sipadan in 1933 and the regulation of activities on the islands.

Moreover, Malaysia demonstrated its continuous control through the construction of lighthouses, the regulation of turtle egg collection, and the development of tourism infrastructure on Sipadan. These activities, documented over a long period, showcased Malaysia’s effective and sustained administration, which ultimately led the ICJ to rule in its favor, granting sovereignty over the islands to Malaysia.

III. The Dispute

Initial Dispute (1969)

The territorial dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia over the Ligitan and Sipadan Islands emerged in 1969, following Indonesia’s discovery of Malaysia’s ongoing activities on Sipadan. Malaysia had established a bird sanctuary on the island as early as 1933 and continued to regulate activities such as turtle egg collection and the development of tourism. This discovery marked the beginning of tensions between the two nations, as Indonesia believed that these actions infringed on what it considered its territory.

Indonesia further claimed that there had been a verbal agreement with Malaysia in 1969 to discuss the sovereignty of the islands. However, Malaysia denied any such agreement, asserting that the islands had always been part of the Malaysian state of Sabah. This misunderstanding fueled the initial discord between the two countries.

Escalation (1991)

The dispute escalated significantly in 1991 when Indonesia intensified its claims over the islands. The trigger for this escalation was Malaysia’s construction of tourist facilities on Sipadan, including chalets and a pier for a private dive company. Indonesia objected to these developments and requested Malaysia to cease its activities. However, Malaysia proceeded with its plans, heightening tensions between the two nations. The construction of these tourist facilities played a crucial role in demonstrating Malaysia’s effective occupation and administration of Sipadan, a key point that later influenced the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to rule in Malaysia’s favor in the final settlement of the dispute.

IV. Legal Proceedings

In 1998, Indonesia and Malaysia took a significant step toward peacefully resolving their territorial dispute over the Ligitan and Sipadan Islands by agreeing to submit the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). This decision was formalized through a Special Agreement signed on May 31, 1997, and officially brought before the ICJ on November 2, 1998. The choice to pursue legal arbitration reflected both nations’ commitment to international law and diplomacy, ensuring that the dispute would be settled through peaceful and lawful means rather than escalating tensions.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) played a pivotal role in facilitating this agreement. As a regional body focused on promoting peace and stability in Southeast Asia, ASEAN encouraged Indonesia and Malaysia to resolve their conflict through legal channels.

On December 17, 2002, the ICJ delivered its final ruling, decisively awarding sovereignty over the Ligitan and Sipadan Islands to Malaysia. The Court’s decision, by a 16-to-1 vote, was primarily based on the principle of “effective occupation,” which Malaysia had clearly demonstrated.

While Indonesia based its claim on the 1891 Convention between Great Britain and the Netherlands, the ICJ concluded that the convention did not clearly define boundaries that would include the disputed islands under Indonesian control.

V. Aftermath and Current Status

Following the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling in 2002, Malaysia and Indonesia took deliberate steps to implement the decision peacefully. Malaysia maintained its administration over Ligitan and Sipadan Islands, focusing primarily on conservation and the development of tourism, particularly on Sipadan, which is world-renowned for its diving spots. Indonesia, respecting the ICJ’s verdict, adjusted its maritime boundaries accordingly. In 2008, Indonesia enacted Government Regulation Number 37, which formally recognized new maritime basepoints that excluded Ligitan and Sipadan.

As of now, Ligitan and Sipadan Islands are administered by Malaysia and fall under the jurisdiction of the state of Sabah. In 2019, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad agreed in principle to transfer the management of the islands from the National Security Council (NSC) back to the Sabah state government. Specifically, the Sabah Tourism, Culture, and Environment Ministry now oversees the islands, with the aim of promoting sustainable tourism and conservation efforts.

However, despite resolving the sovereignty issue, Malaysia and Indonesia continue to face challenges in delimiting their maritime boundaries in the Celebes Sea. The overlapping claims in the Ambalat and East Ambalat sea blocks have led to occasional diplomatic tensions and even naval standoffs. These areas, rich in strategic and economic value, remain the subject of ongoing negotiations as both nations seek a mutually acceptable solution to the complex maritime boundary issue.

The peaceful resolution of the Ligitan and Sipadan dispute through the ICJ set a valuable precedent for handling territorial conflicts in Southeast Asia, demonstrating the efficacy of international law and diplomacy. However, the continued maritime boundary disagreements between Malaysia and Indonesia highlight the broader geopolitical challenges in the region, where overlapping claims often fuel tensions. These disputes highlight the need for sustained regional cooperation, with ASEAN playing a crucial role in promoting peace, stability, and dialogue among its member states.

VI. Conclusion

Indonesia and Malaysia’s territorial dispute over the Ligitan and Sipadan Islands was resolved in 2002 by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which awarded sovereignty to Malaysia based on its effective occupation and administration of the islands. Indonesia’s claim, rooted in the 1891 Convention between Great Britain and the Netherlands, argued that the islands were part of the Dutch East Indies, but this was ultimately rejected by the ICJ.

The decision was a landmark moment in Southeast Asia, facilitated by ASEAN, and highlighted the importance of peaceful, legal resolutions to territorial disputes. While Malaysia has since focused on conservation and tourism development on the islands, and Indonesia has respected the ruling by adjusting its maritime boundaries, challenges remain in delimiting maritime boundaries in the Celebes Sea, particularly in the Ambalat and East Ambalat sea blocks, demonstrating that broader regional geopolitical issues persist.

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Analysis

Would NATO Member States Support the Philippines in the South China Sea Crisis?

In recent years, tensions in the South China Sea have continued to escalate, particularly as China becomes more assertive in its territorial claims. The Philippines, a key player in this geopolitical flashpoint, has repeatedly clashed with China over contested waters. This situation raises an important question: in the event of a serious confrontation between the Philippines and China, would NATO member states come to the aid of the Philippines?

Although NATO is a Euro-Atlantic military alliance with its primary focus on Europe and North America, its increasing involvement in the Indo-Pacific region has drawn attention. NATO members are not bound by legal obligations to defend the Philippines, yet their growing naval presence and strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific may play a significant role in shaping how they respond to a South China Sea crisis.

NATO’s Presence in the Indo-Pacific

NATO has historically maintained a cautious approach toward direct involvement in the Indo-Pacific. However, the security landscape is rapidly changing, and NATO is now stepping up its naval presence in the region. A recent example is the deployment of the Italian aircraft carrier *Cavour* and the USS *Abraham Lincoln*, both of which conducted joint exercises near Guam. Italy, like several other NATO members, is increasingly viewing the Indo-Pacific as an area of strategic importance. Italian Rear Admiral Giancarlo Ciappina stated that this deployment demonstrates Italy’s ability to project power globally, a shift in NATO’s posturing that reflects a broader shift among European nations.

The rise of NATO’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific stems from concerns about China’s growing influence and military capabilities. China has the world’s largest navy by the number of warships, and its aggressive maneuvers near Taiwan and the South China Sea have alarmed not only the U.S. but also its European allies. China’s increased presence in these waters, coupled with its claims over the majority of the South China Sea, has escalated tensions with neighboring countries, including the Philippines.

As a result, European countries like France, the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands have been deploying naval assets to the region. These deployments are not just symbolic; they reflect European recognition of the Indo-Pacific’s critical importance to global trade and security.

Legal and Strategic Constraints for NATO Members

Despite NATO’s growing presence in the region, it is important to note that NATO’s mutual defense obligations, enshrined in Article 5 of the NATO treaty, only apply to attacks on member states in Europe and North America. This means that, legally, NATO members are not compelled to defend the Philippines in the event of a military confrontation with China. The Philippines is not a NATO member, and the South China Sea is far outside NATO’s traditional sphere of operations.

However, NATO’s involvement in global security issues has never been strictly limited by geography. NATO’s mission has evolved since the Cold War, with member states engaging in military operations beyond Europe, such as in Afghanistan and Libya. The inclusion of China in NATO’s guiding strategy document in 2022 marked a significant shift. This document describes China as a challenge to NATO’s “interests, security, and values,” signaling that the alliance is increasingly aware of the need to address security threats beyond its traditional boundaries.

NATO’s growing interoperability with non-member allies like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand further complicates the picture. These countries, often referred to as the Pacific Four, have strengthened their ties with NATO in recent years. Leaders from these nations attended NATO’s 2024 summit, underscoring the alliance’s acknowledgment that the security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions are interconnected. As U.S. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel put it, “The security of the Indo-Pacific and the security of the Euro-Atlantic are two sides of the same coin.”

U.S. Commitment and the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty

While NATO’s legal obligations may be limited in the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. has a separate mutual defense treaty with the Philippines, signed in 1951. This treaty obligates both nations to support each other in the event of an armed attack in the Pacific, providing a much more straightforward path for U.S. involvement in a South China Sea conflict. Given that the U.S. is a leading member of NATO, any military support for the Philippines would likely include collaboration with NATO allies, particularly those with assets in the region.

The United States has already demonstrated its commitment to the Philippines, conducting joint military exercises and providing military aid in the face of Chinese assertiveness. However, as the Pentagon faces growing demands elsewhere, such as in the Middle East and Europe, it may call on its European allies to augment its capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, especially if a crisis in the South China Sea escalates.

European Contributions to Indo-Pacific Security

Although European NATO members are unlikely to take a front-line role in the South China Sea, their contributions to Indo-Pacific security could be crucial in several ways. European navies are increasingly capable of augmenting U.S. forces, whether by providing additional platforms for U.S. aircraft, bolstering submarine-hunting capabilities, or assisting with logistical support. These roles may not involve direct combat with Chinese forces, but they could prove essential in a larger conflict, allowing the U.S. to focus its resources on critical areas.

The UK, for instance, has scheduled the deployment of the HMS *Prince of Wales* carrier strike group to the Pacific in 2025, and France has announced plans to send its *Charles de Gaulle* carrier. These deployments signal a readiness by European powers to maintain a presence in the Indo-Pacific and act as a deterrent to China’s aggressive maneuvers in the South China Sea.

While some analysts argue that European navies cannot substitute for the U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific, their participation could relieve pressure on the U.S. Navy, particularly as American carriers are increasingly stretched across the globe. Brent Sadler of the Heritage Foundation has noted that the U.S. currently lacks the number of carriers needed to sustain global demands, making European support more valuable than ever.

Economic and Strategic Interests

NATO members have economic as well as strategic reasons for their growing interest in the Indo-Pacific. Around 30% of the world’s trade flows through the South China Sea, including a significant portion of Europe’s energy imports. Any disruption in these shipping lanes would have severe repercussions for global trade and energy security. As European countries continue to develop national strategies that emphasize the importance of free-flowing trade in the Indo-Pacific, it becomes clear that their interests are tied to the stability of the region.

Moreover, the Philippines is an important strategic partner for Europe, with shared interests in maintaining a rules-based international order and freedom of navigation. While European nations may not be obligated to defend the Philippines militarily, their interests align closely with Manila’s, particularly regarding the protection of global trade routes and opposition to China’s expansionist policies.

The Risk of Escalation

Despite NATO’s growing involvement in the Indo-Pacific, the risks of military escalation with China cannot be understated. China has consistently criticized NATO’s presence in the region, accusing the alliance of provoking instability. The Chinese government has aligned itself with Russia in condemning NATO, with both countries conducting joint military exercises to demonstrate their opposition to Western influence.

China’s growing military capabilities, including its expanding navy and advancements in missile technology, present a formidable challenge for NATO and its partners. In the event of a conflict in the South China Sea, the involvement of NATO member states would undoubtedly escalate tensions with China, potentially drawing other regional powers into the fray.

Conclusion: A Conditional Support?

In summary, NATO member states are unlikely to be legally or automatically obligated to support the Philippines in the event of a South China Sea crisis. However, the evolving strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific suggests that some level of support could be forthcoming, particularly from the United States and European NATO members with naval assets in the region. While NATO’s primary focus remains the Euro-Atlantic, its growing presence in the Indo-Pacific indicates that it views the region’s stability as essential to global security.

The degree of support would likely depend on the scale of the crisis and the U.S.’s involvement under its mutual defense treaty with the Philippines. European nations, while not leading the charge, could play significant supporting roles, especially if they view China’s actions as a direct threat to international trade or global security. In such a scenario, NATO’s role in the Indo-Pacific would likely be one of augmentation and deterrence, rather than direct intervention.

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