“The Study of History lies at the foundation of all sound Military Conclusion & practice” (Alfred Thayer Mahan) 

Alfred Thayer Mahan, a U.S. naval officer and historian, was hailed by John Keegan as “the most important American strategist of the nineteenth century.” His seminal work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, garnered immediate acclaim, particularly in Europe. This was followed by The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812, which cemented his global prominence.

Mahan believed that national greatness was intrinsically linked to sea power, emphasizing its economic utility in peace and control during war. He utilized historical examples to support his beliefs, advocating that the education of naval officers should be grounded in a thorough study of history. Drawing on the principles of Jomini, Mahan stressed the importance of strategic locations such as choke points, canals, and coaling facilities, along with quantifiable levels of fighting power in a fleet.

He argued that in peacetime, states should enhance production and shipping capacities while acquiring overseas holdings. However, he emphasized that the number of coal fuelling stations and strategic sites should be limited to avoid overextending the mother country’s resources. Mahan posited that a navy’s primary duty was to secure command of the sea, ensuring its own sea communications while denying the adversary access to them and, if necessary, regulating neutral trade. Achieving control of the sea required destroying or neutralizing the enemy fleet rather than targeting commerce. This strategy called for a concentration of naval forces composed of numerous well-manned capital ships, operated on the principle that the best defense is a strong offensive.

Mahan also contended that naval dominance, even temporarily, could be crucial in supporting land forces. He envisioned a transnational consortium using naval power to defend a multinational free trade system. His pre-submarine era ideas slowed the adoption of convoys as a defensive measure against the German U-boat campaign in World War I. By the 1930s, the U.S. Navy had developed long-range submarines to attack Japanese ships. However, during World War II, the Imperial Japanese Navy, adhering to Mahan’s doctrines, used their submarines as fleet auxiliaries and failed to target American supply lines effectively.

Analyzing the Spanish-American War, Mahan noted the vast distances in the Pacific necessitated a battle fleet with long-range striking power. He believed that competent political and naval leadership were as crucial as geography in the development of sea power. His political analysis favored a transnational consortium over a single nation-state and aimed for free commerce rather than autarky. Mahan’s understanding of geography’s impact on strategy was tempered by his recognition of contingency’s role in shaping outcomes.

China’s Attraction to Mahan’s 

China’s naval establishment has long revered the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan. It is no exaggeration to say that no single thinker has had a greater influence on Chinese maritime policy since post-revolutionary China began focusing on the sea in the late twentieth century. However, this is changing. Chinese naval strategists are increasingly drawn to the works of British naval thinker Sir Julian Corbett. This shift reflects and promotes a significant change in Chinese grand strategy, with implications for the United States and the entire Indo-Pacific region.

Mahan’s primary arguments, while innovative in the nineteenth century, are relatively straightforward. He asserted that great nations, even innately insular ones like the United States, have crucial maritime interests ranging from coastal defense to the protection of major commerce routes. Consequently, every truly great power must safeguard its interests from potential threats. For Mahan, this meant that a powerful nation must control the world’s oceans. He argued that such dominance could only be achieved by decisively defeating the enemy’s major fleet in battle. Therefore, commerce raiding and other fragmented naval operations were distractions that could never be strategically decisive. The concentration of forces and what Mahan termed “offensive defense” were essential to achieving “command of the seas,” which he saw as the primary goal of great power naval strategy.

The reasons for Mahan’s popularity among both American and Chinese navalists are evident. Mahan wrote for and about a rising power, the United States, which was realizing the need to secure key maritime interests to prosper and fulfill its destiny as a great power. Initially, he believed these interests were concentrated in the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the sea lanes that would emerge with the opening of the Panama Canal. As his ideas evolved and U.S. interests extended beyond nearby waters, Mahan focused on the far seas, which he deemed critical to U.S. security and prosperity. This perspective appealed to American leaders such as President Theodore Roosevelt, who envisioned the United States as a true global superpower. Successive generations of American naval and political leaders saw that as the United States established itself as a global power, it required a navy capable of global operations.

Contemporary Chinese naval and political leaders are drawn to Mahan’s ideas for similar reasons. As market reforms spurred economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s, and China became more dependent on seaborne trade, Chinese officials recognized the importance of securing their maritime interests. Initially, these interests were framed in terms of China’s near seas: dominating the waters of the East and South China Seas, following a rough curve from Japan in the north, past Taiwan and the Philippines, down to Singapore and Malaysia, and preventing China from being hemmed in by the “First Island Chain.” Later, as China’s maritime trade routes globalized, Chinese naval strategists shifted their focus to the far seas, which were increasingly seen as vital to Chinese security and prosperity. Throughout these periods, Mahan’s works provided a conceptual foundation for considering the naval strategy best suited for a rising China. Although the Chinese naval establishment largely rejected Mahan’s ideas on decisive battles and removing the enemy fleet from the seas, they enthusiastically embraced his views on the necessity for a great power to have a navy capable of global operations.

Shift to Julian Corbett

Chinese naval strategists have inherited and adapted Mahan’s notion that a great state needs a fleet capable of seizing control of critical waterways and choke points from powerful adversaries, ensuring the security of global commerce on which its prosperity depends. They also internalized his view that a truly great power requires a truly powerful navy, capable of not just safeguarding its maritime interests but also projecting its influence globally. However, over the last decade or two, Chinese navalists have increasingly turned to the work of British naval historian Sir Julian Corbett.

Corbett agreed with Mahan on the importance of controlling vital sea channels for both military and commercial interests but differed on several key points. Most fundamentally, Corbett disagreed with Mahan’s near-exclusive emphasis on achieving ultimate dominance of the seas by annihilating the enemy’s naval might in decisive battles. Mahan’s basic idea of “naval strategy” was that comprehensive command of the seas was always the best method to achieve a great power’s broad strategic goals, accomplished by sweeping the enemy fleet away. Corbett, however, believed that each great power’s grand strategy necessitated a unique “maritime strategy.” While Mahan advocated for bringing the enemy’s main fleet to battle and destroying it in a decisive engagement, Corbett suggested that maritime strategy could also involve temporary and limited “control of the sea,” blockade, trade raiding and defense, or homeland defense, depending on the grand strategy being pursued. Corbett, like Clausewitz, believed that politics should always dictate military strategy, and that maritime policy should be based on a nation’s specific political goals, objectives, and limitations.

There are several reasons for Chinese navalists’ growing interest in Corbett’s work. Perhaps the most important cause has been a significant shift in China’s grand strategy over the last decade or so. For much of the post-revolutionary period, China’s strategy was one of geopolitical prudence, even isolationism, with priorities focused on defending the Chinese mainland, reintegrating lost territories, and pressing limited claims to disputed territories. However, in recent decades, China has effectively adopted a new grand strategy, best described as “offshore balancing.”

This strategy involves three main components:

1. Securing Land and Maritime Borders: China is committed to securing its borders, including sovereignty over the waters along the new ten dash line in the South China Sea, disputed territories along its boundary with India, islands claimed in the East China Sea, and Taiwan. This also includes preventing the United States from threatening the Chinese mainland or intervening in territorial disputes involving China.
2. Dominating Immediate Neighbors: China aims to dominate its immediate neighbors, both territorially contiguous ones (e.g., Nepal, Bhutan, and Vietnam) and those in the maritime region between its home waters and the Second Island Chain.
3. Maintaining a Favorable Balance of Power: China seeks to maintain a favorable balance of power as far afield as the Third Island Chain (encompassing Alaska, Hawaii, and New Zealand), the Fourth Island Chain (linking Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Diego Garcia), and the Fifth Island Chain (stretching from Djibouti to South Africa, including the Persian Gulf). In this context, a favorable balance of power is one that is not dominated by a single state but leans toward China, implying an unfavorable balance for the United States.

Corbett’s theories align well with this grand strategy, as they emphasize the need for a flexible maritime strategy tailored to specific political goals. For China, this means developing the capability to:

• Deter, Delay, and Weaken Potential U.S. Military Engagement: China aims to prevent, delay, and, if necessary, weaken any potential U.S. military involvement in maritime sovereignty issues or conflicts involving Taiwan. This strategy focuses on protecting China’s coastline and ports while establishing and defending sovereignty claims.
• Deny U.S. Command of the Seas: China seeks to deny the United States control over commercially and strategically important waterways and chokepoints. This requires maintaining a persistent maritime presence in strategic locations, even under hostile conditions and for extended periods.
• Counter India’s Naval Capabilities: China aims to prevent India from controlling or disrupting crucial sea routes and choke points leading to the Fifth Island Chain.

China has been implementing this maritime strategy for more than a decade. It has developed and deployed air, naval, and missile forces to create an anti-access/ area-denial (A2/AD) bubble encompassing the East China Sea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea, including its entire coastline and disputed islands. These forces include submarines, surface combatants, aircraft, anti-aircraft weapons, and anti-ship cruise missiles, supported by major naval bases in Qingdao, Ningbo, Zhanjiang, and Hainan Island, as well as installations in the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

Beyond these near seas defensive zone, China has deployed naval forces to dominate the seas up to the Second Island Chain. These forces include modern land-attack ballistic and cruise missiles capable of striking U.S. military sites on Okinawa and Guam, as well as anti-ship ballistic missiles with advanced re-entry vehicle technology, designed to deter, delay, and, if necessary, impair U.S. military operations, denying the U.S. control of the seas within the Second Island Chain.

China is also extending its reach beyond the Fifth Island Chain. It frequently deploys ships, including nuclear-powered submarines, in the Indian Ocean and surrounding areas, maintains a naval station in Djibouti, and controls port facilities in Hambantota, Sri Lanka, and Gwadar, Pakistan. Additionally, China reportedly has a military observation base on Myanmar’s Coco Islands in the Bay of Bengal, facilitating Chinese naval access to the Indian Ocean. Recently, China and Iran formed a strategic alliance, including joint training, research and weapon development, intelligence sharing, and Chinese investment in Iranian ports, adding to China’s “string of pearls.”

As China completes its offshore balancing infrastructure, Chinese carrier strike groups may begin to patrol the Indian Ocean regularly, challenging U.S. and allied naval dominance in the region. 

End Note

“Force is never more operative than what it is known to exist but is not brandished”

Alfred Thayer Mahan’s influence on maritime strategy, particularly in the context of the South China Sea, remains profound and enduring. Mahan, a prominent naval theorist of the late 19th century, emphasized the strategic significance of sea power in shaping global geopolitics. His ideas highlight the importance of controlling maritime routes and establishing naval dominance to secure national interests and global influence.

In the South China Sea, Mahan’s theories resonate deeply as nations vie for control over critical sea lanes and disputed territories rich in natural resources. Mahan’s concept of sea power has influenced modern maritime strategies in the region, prompting countries like China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and others to invest heavily in naval capabilities and infrastructure. China, in particular, has drawn from Mahan’s principles to assert its claims over almost the entire South China Sea. This has been achieved through a combination of naval expansion, island-building, and diplomatic maneuvering to strengthen its position. This strategy reflects Mahan’s emphasis on the strategic value of controlling key maritime chokepoints and establishing naval dominance to secure economic and military advantages.

Moreover, Mahan’s theories continue to shape international responses to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. The United States and its allies, adhering to Mahanian principles, have adopted strategies aimed at preserving freedom of navigation and countering China’s expansive claims through enhanced naval presence, multilateral partnerships, and support for regional allies. This approach underscores Mahan’s enduring relevance in contemporary naval doctrine, where the South China Sea has become a focal point of geopolitical competition and strategic maneuvering.

In essence, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s theories on sea power have profoundly influenced the strategic calculus in the South China Sea and continue to shape modern maritime strategies. His emphasis on naval dominance, control of maritime routes, and the strategic value of sea lanes remains pertinent as nations navigate complex geopolitical dynamics in one of the world’s most contested maritime regions. 

In 2012, the United Nations recognized Benham Rise, located off the east coast of the Philippines, as part of the country’s extended continental shelf. This recognition was uncontested by China. Fast forward to today, the Philippines has submitted a new claim to the United Nations for an extended continental shelf (ECS) in the South China Sea—a region marked by increasingly hostile maritime conflicts with China. Marshall Louis Alferez, the foreign ministry’s assistant secretary for maritime and ocean affairs, emphasized the importance of securing the Philippines’ future by asserting their exclusive right to explore and exploit natural resources within their ECS entitlement. China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea overlap with territories claimed by the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Despite a 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration that invalidated China’s claims, Beijing continues to dispute this decision. The recent UN submission by the Philippines aims to delineate the outer limits of its continental shelf, extending up to 350 nautical miles.

Let’s get into the detail of it.

Rising Tensions between China and Philippines in the South China Sea 

Rising maritime tensions between China and the Philippines have highlighted the hazards of armed conflict in the South China Sea. The region is embroiled in complex sovereignty disputes involving multiple countries with competing claims over various features and maritime entitlements. However, recent incidents between Beijing and Manila have raised the most significant concerns. The Philippines maintains nine outposts in the Spratly Islands, a contentious cluster of land and sea features at the heart of the South China Sea. One such outpost, Second Thomas Shoal, has become a perilous flashpoint. Here, Chinese vessels continually attempt to obstruct Manila’s efforts to resupply the BRP Sierra Madre, a rusting ship deliberately grounded by a former Philippine government in 1999 to assert sovereignty over the atoll. Although China also claims the shoal, it began interfering with these resupply missions in 2014. Relations have reached unprecedented turbulence over the past several months, with Chinese ships repeatedly assaulting Philippine supply vessels and deploying water cannons, injuring sailors.

The South China Sea has thus become a hotspot for potential conflict, with Washington and Beijing at odds. This tension prompted then-President Benigno Aquino to challenge China’s territorial claims under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). On July 12, 2016, the arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of Manila, invalidating China’s claim to waters within its “nine-dash line,” which roughly encompasses the entire South China Sea. However, Beijing dismissed the ruling and undermined efforts to resolve the dispute legally by constructing and fortifying artificial islands in the Spratlys while the case was pending. This move significantly altered the status quo, enabling Beijing to establish permanent garrisons in the area.

A brief lull in the maritime dispute occurred after Rodrigo Duterte succeeded Aquino in 2016. Duterte adopted a pragmatic approach towards Beijing, downplaying the tribunal’s ruling and seeking economic benefits from China. Despite his efforts, tensions at sea persisted, with regular standoffs between the Philippine coast guard and Chinese vessels. Filipino fishermen struggled to access their traditional fishing grounds, and Manila could not exploit the valuable oil and gas reserves within its exclusive economic zone, as recognized under international law. In March 2021, the situation escalated when Chinese ships amassed on Whitsun Reef, an uninhabited feature in the sea, prompting senior Philippine officials to publicly criticize China’s actions for the first time in years. By the end of Duterte’s presidency, the Philippines had renewed ties with the United States and filed numerous diplomatic protests against China.

Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who succeeded Duterte in 2022, initially sought to maintain friendly relations with Beijing. However, this relationship soured within months. Despite China being the Philippines’ largest trading partner, Marcos Jr.’s meetings with President Xi Jinping failed to yield significant new investments or curb China’s aggressive “grey zone” tactics in the South China Sea. These setbacks led Marcos Jr. to strengthen ties with Washington, with the Biden administration repeatedly affirming that the Mutual Defense Treaty would be invoked in the event of an armed attack on Philippine warships, aircraft, or government vessels.

West has traditionally advocated for the peaceful resolution of South China Sea disputes, emphasizing adherence to international law while avoiding taking sides. However, China’s assertiveness and expanding military capabilities have prompted a shift in European perspectives. The EU and several member states have developed “Indo-Pacific” strategies to enhance cooperation with regional countries. Brussels has also increased diplomatic support for the Philippines, issuing supportive statements following maritime altercations. In 2021, the EU appointed a special envoy for the Indo-Pacific, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited Manila in July 2023, the first visit by a Commission President, to express the EU’s readiness to enhance maritime security cooperation.

Background on the ECS Claim

The process of filing a claim before the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) involves several critical steps. Initially, a coastal state conducts comprehensive scientific and technical studies to delineate the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its baselines. These studies rely on geological, geomorphological, and geophysical data. Upon completion of these studies, the state prepares a detailed submission, which includes charts and coordinates, for review by the CLCS. The commission then examines the data, may request additional information, and, if the submission meets the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) requirements, provides recommendations. These recommendations form the basis for the coastal state’s establishment of the outer limits of its continental shelf, which are final and binding.

As the world’s coastal states divide up the ocean floor, the CLCS’s work becomes increasingly vital. The “Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Law and Legitimacy” examines the Commission from two perspectives: a legal examination of its decision-making process and a study of its normative legitimacy. The CLCS exists to facilitate the implementation of UNCLOS in establishing the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. Under UNCLOS, a coastal state must set the outer boundaries of its continental shelf where it exceeds 200 nautical miles, based on the Commission’s advice. The Commission offers recommendations to coastal states on creating such limits. However, its recommendations and actions do not affect the delimitation of boundaries between states with opposite or adjacent coasts.

Territorial and maritime sovereignty

There are two major points of contention: territorial sovereignty and maritime sovereignty. Territorial sovereignty conflicts concern claims of lawful possession of the territory itself, often relying on historical presence to determine rightful control. Maritime boundary conflicts pertain to the territorial delimitations permitted by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

UNCLOS established a 12-nautical-mile territorial sovereignty limit from a country’s coastline and a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that covers seabed resources within that sphere from the shoreline. This is significant because the country with authority over the islands also controls the natural resources in the surrounding area. In the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS) territorial disputes, there have been no fundamental resolutions of territorial sovereignty or marine boundary delimitations acceptable to all parties involved. Competing sovereignty claims stem from fundamentally different views on historical ownership rights, making convergence and reconciliation difficult to achieve.

The potentially rich natural resources in the claimed EEZs are central to the territorial disputes. Regarding maritime delimitation, scholars like Mark J. Valencia and Unryu Suganuma have noted that joint resource development can help build cooperative frameworks between the claimants, potentially leading to a more institutionalized method of energy resource distribution in the long run. Advancing resource cooperation in areas where China does not have administrative control over some disputed islands (such as the Spratly Islands and Senkaku Diaoyu Islands) can be a practical way to progress without acknowledging the other party’s sovereignty claims. Deng Xiaoping considered the “shelving” policy of collaboration as realistic for mutual economic gains while not jeopardizing China’s sovereignty claims. In the Senkaku Diaoyu conflict, there has been some progress in bilateral resource development, including a fisheries deal in 1997 and an agreement to develop the Shirakaba Chunxiao oil field in 2008. Long-term cooperative development activities are likely to be the most realistic and beneficial for creating trust and promoting positive-sum gains. Southeast Asian countries will likely choose regional security cooperation from powers like the United States and Japan in the foreseeable future. Establishing trust and providing comfort in bilateral interactions, both verbally and in action, will be critical in breaking the “suspicion begetting suspicion” and “fear begetting fear” cycles. Formalizing collaborative development frameworks will be essential for the SCS and ECS islands due to their geopolitical significance and will be a crucial determinant of future cooperation.

Securing maritime entitlements and resources through this process is highly significant for coastal states. It allows to exercise sovereign rights over the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil, including valuable hydrocarbons, minerals, and biological resources. Establishing clear maritime boundaries also helps prevent conflicts with neighboring states and ensures that the coastal state can manage and exploit its marine resources sustainably. Furthermore, it strengthens the state’s legal and political standing in asserting its maritime claims, contributing to regional stability and fostering economic development.

Article 76 of UNCLOS provides the legal basis for coastal states to establish the outer limits of their continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from their baselines. According to this article, a coastal state can extend its continental shelf if it meets specific geological criteria, including the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin or a distance of up to 350 nautical miles from the baselines or 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 meter isobath, whichever is greater. Coastal states must submit scientific and technical data to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) for validation.

The 2016 Arbitral Award, issued by the Permanent Court of Arbitration under UNCLOS, affirmed the Philippines’ maritime entitlements in the South China Sea. The tribunal ruled that China’s claims based on the “nine-dash line” had no legal basis under UNCLOS and clarified the entitlements of the Philippines within its EEZ and continental shelf. This award strengthens the Philippines’ legal standing and supports its claims for an extended continental shelf under UNCLOS provisions.

China Rejects Philippines’ Attempt to Extend Continental Shelf in South China Sea

China has rejected the Philippines’ request to seek UN approval for extending its continental shelf in the South China Sea, aiming to secure “exclusive” rights to exploit underwater resources. “The Philippines unilaterally submitted a case regarding the delimitation of the outer continental shelf in the South China Sea, infringing upon China’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction,” said China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian.

Beijing claims a vast ocean territory under its “nine-dash line,” which extends hundreds of miles south and east from Hainan Province. However, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled in 2016 that this claim has no legal basis under international law. Despite this ruling, China has rejected the verdict and has been in talks with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since 2002 to establish a code of conduct in the contested sea.

The Philippines submitted a request to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to determine the extent of its underwater continental shelf in the West Palawan Region facing the South China Sea. “The seabed and subsoil extending from our archipelago up to the maximum extent allowed by UNCLOS hold significant potential resources that will benefit our nation and people for generations to come,” said Philippine Foreign Assistant Secretary Marshall Louis Alferez. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) grants a coastal state exclusive rights to utilize natural resources on the continental shelf. Beijing strongly opposes the Philippines’ move, urging the panel not to investigate Manila’s submission as it covers disputed maritime space.

China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated that the commission should not evaluate or qualify the Philippines’ proposal if it includes the delimitation of disputed waters, following CLCS’s norms of procedure. Lin indicated that Beijing is still gathering information, but views Manila’s “unilateral submission” as a violation of China’s sovereign rights. Maritime affairs experts agree, predicting that Manila’s petition is unlikely to succeed and that Beijing will perceive the move as a legal challenge exacerbating South China Sea tensions. “It seems unlikely that CLCS will be able to validate any such claim. the Commission has, as a rule, avoided making any delimitation decisions when there are outstanding jurisdictional or sovereignty disputes,” said Isaac Kardon, senior fellow for China studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Beijing would see the claim as “another legal and political challenge from Manila,” similar to the 2016 arbitration, and as an attempt to undermine China’s broad claims through a UN institutional approach, he added.

China’s Foreign Ministry said it is still gathering information regarding Manila’s “unilateral submission” of an enlarged continental shelf. Mainland China claims nearly the entire South China Sea, which includes territory claimed by the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam. While the specifics of Manila’s submission had not yet been made public, its continental shelf claims might overlap with those of other coastal governments in the South China Sea, potentially leading other claimant states to use similar techniques. “The Philippines’ submission could set a precedent for other claimant states, who may file similar ECS (extended continental shelf) submissions to assert their rights,” said Ding Duo, associate research fellow at Hainan’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies. He noted that claimant countries might file their applications alone or together, adding that either scenario would complicate the South China Sea conflicts.

“This will make the dispute even more complex and harder to resolve, and introduces a new point of contention for how Beijing and Manila should properly manage and handle their differences in the South China Sea,” Ding told the press.

Maritime observers believed that Beijing would respond to Manila with harsh operational and diplomatic actions. “China might also increase the intensity of their interdictions at Second Thomas Shoal or escalate elsewhere in the South China Sea against Philippine interests,” Carnegie’s Kardon said, adding that China might choose to publish baselines around the Spratlys to challenge the Philippines’ claims. Baselines are essential in determining marine boundaries and exerting control over resources since they serve as the starting point for measuring a country’s territorial sea, EEZ, and continental shelf.

The Philippines Dilemma: How to manage tensions in the SCS?

The Philippines is a significant actor in the South China Sea territorial disputes, which are intensifying as China asserts itself and claimant governments compete for resources. Rather than using international law to counter China’s claims, President Rodrigo Duterte has taken a pragmatic approach, avoiding confrontation in hopes of reaping economic benefits. However, five years later, it appears this strategy has not fully paid off. The simmering maritime dispute between Manila and Beijing has become more entangled with geopolitical competition between China and the United States and its allies. Given the increased potential for escalating events at sea, Manila should advocate for a substantive and effective Code of Conduct between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to control maritime tensions while maintaining diplomatic channels with Beijing to avoid misunderstandings. Additionally, promoting regional collaboration, such as in fisheries management, would be beneficial.

Duterte, eager to reduce ties with the United States and extend his strategic options, has minimized the question of territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea during his administration, focusing instead on economic gains from China. In line with this strategy, he downplayed Manila’s victory in a 2016 arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which rejected Beijing’s wide claims of sovereignty and “historic rights” over the sea. Since then, Manila has maintained a flexible policy, often viewed as erratic by local and international observers, with the goal of strengthening connections with Beijing to promote economic growth. By advancing cautiously, the Philippines wanted to prevent the maritime issue from jeopardizing its bilateral relationship. However, five years into Duterte’s administration, problems persist.

Chinese ships patrol the Philippine exclusive economic zone without interruption, and Filipino vessels are frequently unable to reach traditional fishing grounds near Scarborough Shoal due to Chinese harassment. Many Filipinos are growing suspicious of rapprochement with China if it means giving up claims to contested sea features. Since late 2019, Manila has shown less willingness to ignore Beijing’s aggression in the South China Sea, submitting diplomatic protest notes to China in reaction to purported territorial transgressions.

More importantly, Duterte reversed his abrupt February 2020 revocation of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States, which permits the US to deploy military personnel in the Philippines and undertake joint exercises with Manila. In June 2020, Duterte suspended the cancellation. The United States then began referring to China’s claims in the South China Sea as “illegal,” reaffirmed its alliance with the Philippines, and stated that the Mutual Defense Treaty covers attacks on Philippine forces or vessels in the Sea. A confrontation in March 2021 over Whitsun Reef in the disputed Spratly Islands, involving hundreds of Chinese ships, further inflamed anti-China sentiment in the Philippines and strained relations. On July 30, 2021, Duterte formally reinstated the Visiting Forces Agreement.

Balancing a treaty relationship with the United States with periodic conflicts with neighbors, including a rising great power like China, is particularly challenging. Manila is allied with Washington through a longstanding relationship, but geographical and economic realities necessitate a compromise with Beijing. Simultaneously, Internal conflicts within the bureaucratic establishment and military, along with the interaction of elite interests and public opinion, often lead to apparent inconsistencies in government policy. To manage tensions and reduce the risk of maritime incidents escalating into conflict, the Philippines should bolster risk management measures and advocate for regional security cooperation.

Conclusion

The South China Sea disputes are complex, involving multiple countries and a range of economic, strategic, and security considerations, with phases of escalation and quiet. Recent tensions are increasingly tied to US-China strategic competition, complicating Manila’s foreign policy. Following Duterte’s 2016 election victory, the Philippines pivoted towards China, but opinions are mixed on whether this approach has served national interests, especially given Duterte’s ad hoc methods. If the next president adopts a less pro-China stance, more incidents at sea are likely post-Duterte. However, as the Whitsun Reef incident showed, Manila can manage Beijing with cooperation and deterrence. Manila’s long-term strength may lie in separating disputes from broader China relations and standing firm when necessary. The key concern is whether the Philippines can navigate between China and the US without choosing sides in a conflict. While Manila is currently hedging effectively, rising regional tensions may make this balance unsustainable. (MEHRAAN BHAI YEH CROP KR DAIN HIGHLIGHTED WALA )The deep waters of the South China Sea are expected to remain contentious, but finalizing a Code of Conduct and enhancing regional collaboration could help prevent future escalations. Success in extending its continental shelf at the International Court of Justice depends on strong scientific data, legal arguments, and cooperative dialogue with neighbouring states, adhering to international standards and fostering a collaborative spirit.

In an increasingly interconnected global landscape, regional conflicts reverberate far beyond their immediate theaters. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict has drawn significant attention and resources from Western powers, particularly the United States. Simultaneously, the Middle East simmers with volatility, with actors such as Israel, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis edging closer to war. In this turbulence, China sees opportunities to assert its dominance in the South China Sea (SCS), potentially destabilizing Southeast Asia and testing U.S. security commitments in the region.

The Middle Eastern Powder Keg

The Middle East, a region historically marked by geopolitical strife, finds itself at a critical crossroads. Since the surprise attack by Hamas on Israel on October 7, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has escalated dramatically. The situation is further complicated by the threat posed by Hezbollah in Lebanon, backed by Iran, to Israel’s northern settlements.

Meanwhile, the Houthis in Yemen, also backed by Iran, have disrupted maritime traffic in the Red Sea, adding another layer of complexity to the already volatile situation. With the prospect of war seeming imminent, Israel hopes for a swift victory through a blitzkrieg, but U.S. officials foresee a protracted conflict that could bog down the region and threaten long-term peace.

In light of these escalating tensions, the U.S. has offered significant assurances to Israel. Senior U.S. officials have reassured their Israeli counterparts that if a full-scale war breaks out on Israel’s northern border with Hezbollah, the Biden administration is fully prepared to back its ally. This assurance comes amidst increasing cross-border attacks between Israel and the Iran-backed Hezbollah, heightening fears of another full-fledged conflict in the Middle East.

However, U.S. officials have serious concerns that in the event of a full-blown war between Israel and Hezbollah, the Iran-backed militant group could overwhelm Israel’s air defenses in the north, including the Iron Dome system.

In recent meetings, U.S. and Israeli officials discussed potential “off-ramps” to de-escalate tensions along the Blue Line separating Lebanon and Israel.

The potential conflict in the Middle East also impacts U.S. strategic plans. While the U.S. has been attempting to pivot towards Asia, escalating tensions in the Middle East could hinder these efforts. The U.S. has been reshuffling its warship deployment in the region to maintain dominance, but a wider war in the Middle East could force the U.S. to focus more on this region, potentially affecting its strategic commitments elsewhere.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: A Preoccupation for the West

The conflict in Ukraine grinds on, marked by intense fighting as Ukrainian forces launch offensives to regain lost territory. Despite a recent peace summit in Switzerland, the path towards resolution remains daunting. The summit yielded a “Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework,” supported by a majority of attendees, pledging concrete steps on critical issues like nuclear threats, food security, and prisoner exchanges. However, Russia’s absence cast a long shadow, with its spokesman Dmitry Peskov dismissing the talks as irrelevant.

These developments highlight the conflict’s protracted nature and the difficulty of finding a solution without all parties at the table. The United States and its NATO allies have committed billions of dollars in aid and military support to Ukraine. As of mid-2024, the U.S. has provided over $40 billion in military assistance. This substantial investment indicates a preoccupation that might detract from the U.S.’s ability to respond robustly to crises elsewhere, particularly in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific region.

The South China Sea: A Brewing Storm

As the U.S. grapples with simultaneous conflicts in Ukraine and potentially the Middle East, China perceives a strategic window to advance its interests in the South China Sea. The sea is a crucial maritime route, vital for international trade and regional economies, particularly those of Southeast Asian nations like Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. China’s aggressive territorial claims and militarization of artificial islands have long been sources of regional tension.

Recently, China has ramped up its activities, including constructing military bases on disputed islands and increasing naval patrols. The U.S. has responded with freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) to assert the principle of international waters. However, with the U.S. potentially distracted, China might escalate its activities, pushing the boundaries of its influence and testing the resolve of Southeast Asian nations and their security alliances.

Implications for Southeast Asian Nations

The potential for increased Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS) poses significant risks for Southeast Asia. Economically, the region heavily relies on the stability of maritime routes for trade. Over $3.37 trillion worth of international trade passes through the SCS annually. Any disruption, such as those potentially caused by China’s growing assertiveness, could have cascading effects on global supply chains, impacting economies already strained by the pandemic.

Security-wise, Southeast Asian nations find themselves in an increasingly precarious position. The Philippines, a key U.S. ally, has experienced direct confrontations with Chinese vessels in its own Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In response to Chinese incursions, the Philippines has condemned China’s actions and asserted that such aggressive maneuvers will not prevent it from carrying out rotation and resupply missions to its troops in the West Philippine Sea. Philippine Former Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. called for stronger U.S. involvement back in 2021, stating, “We need the Americans. We need their presence in the South China Sea.” Today, the call for American presence in the South China Sea resonates even more powerfully, reflecting the escalating tension and the urgent need for stability in the region.

Moreover, China’s recent military exercises simulating an invasion of Taiwan have raised concerns about its intentions and the potential for escalation in the region. These exercises, which included mock missile strikes, have put Taiwan and other regional powers on high alert, highlighting the broader security implications of Chinese military assertiveness.

Similarly, Vietnam has fortified its own claims and sought closer security ties with the U.S. and other regional powers.  Its newly elected President To Lam is keen on gradually expanding security and defense relationships with the United States. The aim is to enhance collaboration in fields like cybersecurity, counter-terrorism, and combating transnational crimes. This move is a part of Vietnam’s strategic approach to maintain balanced relationships with the world’s major powers.

The web of alliances and rivalries in Southeast Asia means that any significant disruption in the South China Sea could lead to broader regional instability, with profound implications for both regional and global security.

U.S. Security Commitments: A Test of Resolve

The U.S. has long maintained a security presence in the Indo-Pacific, highlighted by its alliances with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and its strategic partnerships with nations like Singapore and Vietnam. However, the strain of managing conflicts on multiple fronts—Ukraine, potentially the Middle East, and then in the South China Sea—could test American resolve and capability.

The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, however, emphasizes a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” with commitments to deter aggression and maintain regional stability. Yet, a perceived or actual reduction in U.S. military presence and engagement in Southeast Asia could embolden China, altering the regional balance of power. Admiral John C. Aquilino, commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, has stressed the importance of maintaining U.S. presence, stating, “The security environment is becoming more complex, and we must be prepared to respond to threats in multiple theaters” .

The viewpoint of the U.S. public towards foreign interventions is a crucial factor. Recent polls indicate a growing reluctance among Americans towards military involvement abroad. If this sentiment continues to intensify, it could influence U.S. strategic considerations. The impact of this domestic pressure on the U.S.’s determination to uphold its security commitments in the Indo-Pacific and the Arab world remains to be seen.

 China’s Strategic Calculus

China is likely to perceive the U.S.’s preoccupation with other global conflicts as an opportune moment to consolidate its position in the SCS. Beijing has historically sought to avoid direct military confrontation with the U.S., opting instead for incremental gains through strategic maneuvers. Should the U.S. appear overstretched, China might intensify its activities in the SCS, including more aggressive patrolling, establishing further military outposts, and pressuring Southeast Asian nations diplomatically and economically.

Yan Xuetong, a prominent Chinese scholar of international relations, asserts that China’s strategy aims to secure regional dominance and protect maritime interests. He advocates for enhancing “comprehensive national power” through a balanced approach: strengthening control over the SCS while avoiding direct conflict with the U.S. This strategy combines military readiness with diplomatic engagement to manage tensions without provoking a full-scale confrontation.

Diplomatic engagement plays a crucial role in China’s strategy. Beijing seeks to divide and weaken the unified stance of ASEAN countries by offering economic incentives to some while isolating more vocal opponents like Vietnam and the Philippines. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) exemplifies this, as Beijing leverages economic investments to expand its influence across Southeast Asia. Nations such as Cambodia and Laos, heavily reliant on Chinese investments, might find it challenging to oppose Chinese ambitions in the SCS. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian has reiterated China’s stance, asserting, “China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and their adjacent waters”.

China’s diplomatic efforts are complemented by its participation in regional forums and international organizations, where it aims to shape the narrative and build support for its claims. This multifaceted approach allows China to advance its strategic objectives while managing the risks of direct confrontation. As the U.S. navigates conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, China’s opportunity to consolidate SCS claims heightens, reshaping Southeast Asia’s geopolitical dynamics.

End Note

The web of global geopolitics suggests that a wider conflict in the Middle East would have profound implications beyond its immediate vicinity, potentially destabilizing Southeast Asia and altering the strategic dynamics of the South China Sea. For Southeast Asian nations, the challenge lies in understanding this complex landscape, balancing their security needs with economic realities. For the U.S., maintaining its security commitments in the Indo-Pacific while addressing crises elsewhere will be a formidable test of its global leadership and strategic resilience. As the world watches developments in the Middle East, the stakes for Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region cannot be overstated.