In 2012, the United Nations recognized Benham Rise, located off the east coast of the Philippines, as part of the country’s extended continental shelf. This recognition was uncontested by China. Fast forward to today, the Philippines has submitted a new claim to the United Nations for an extended continental shelf (ECS) in the South China Sea—a region marked by increasingly hostile maritime conflicts with China. Marshall Louis Alferez, the foreign ministry’s assistant secretary for maritime and ocean affairs, emphasized the importance of securing the Philippines’ future by asserting their exclusive right to explore and exploit natural resources within their ECS entitlement. China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea overlap with territories claimed by the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Despite a 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration that invalidated China’s claims, Beijing continues to dispute this decision. The recent UN submission by the Philippines aims to delineate the outer limits of its continental shelf, extending up to 350 nautical miles.

Let’s get into the detail of it.

Rising Tensions between China and Philippines in the South China Sea 

Rising maritime tensions between China and the Philippines have highlighted the hazards of armed conflict in the South China Sea. The region is embroiled in complex sovereignty disputes involving multiple countries with competing claims over various features and maritime entitlements. However, recent incidents between Beijing and Manila have raised the most significant concerns. The Philippines maintains nine outposts in the Spratly Islands, a contentious cluster of land and sea features at the heart of the South China Sea. One such outpost, Second Thomas Shoal, has become a perilous flashpoint. Here, Chinese vessels continually attempt to obstruct Manila’s efforts to resupply the BRP Sierra Madre, a rusting ship deliberately grounded by a former Philippine government in 1999 to assert sovereignty over the atoll. Although China also claims the shoal, it began interfering with these resupply missions in 2014. Relations have reached unprecedented turbulence over the past several months, with Chinese ships repeatedly assaulting Philippine supply vessels and deploying water cannons, injuring sailors.

The South China Sea has thus become a hotspot for potential conflict, with Washington and Beijing at odds. This tension prompted then-President Benigno Aquino to challenge China’s territorial claims under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). On July 12, 2016, the arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of Manila, invalidating China’s claim to waters within its “nine-dash line,” which roughly encompasses the entire South China Sea. However, Beijing dismissed the ruling and undermined efforts to resolve the dispute legally by constructing and fortifying artificial islands in the Spratlys while the case was pending. This move significantly altered the status quo, enabling Beijing to establish permanent garrisons in the area.

A brief lull in the maritime dispute occurred after Rodrigo Duterte succeeded Aquino in 2016. Duterte adopted a pragmatic approach towards Beijing, downplaying the tribunal’s ruling and seeking economic benefits from China. Despite his efforts, tensions at sea persisted, with regular standoffs between the Philippine coast guard and Chinese vessels. Filipino fishermen struggled to access their traditional fishing grounds, and Manila could not exploit the valuable oil and gas reserves within its exclusive economic zone, as recognized under international law. In March 2021, the situation escalated when Chinese ships amassed on Whitsun Reef, an uninhabited feature in the sea, prompting senior Philippine officials to publicly criticize China’s actions for the first time in years. By the end of Duterte’s presidency, the Philippines had renewed ties with the United States and filed numerous diplomatic protests against China.

Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who succeeded Duterte in 2022, initially sought to maintain friendly relations with Beijing. However, this relationship soured within months. Despite China being the Philippines’ largest trading partner, Marcos Jr.’s meetings with President Xi Jinping failed to yield significant new investments or curb China’s aggressive “grey zone” tactics in the South China Sea. These setbacks led Marcos Jr. to strengthen ties with Washington, with the Biden administration repeatedly affirming that the Mutual Defense Treaty would be invoked in the event of an armed attack on Philippine warships, aircraft, or government vessels.

West has traditionally advocated for the peaceful resolution of South China Sea disputes, emphasizing adherence to international law while avoiding taking sides. However, China’s assertiveness and expanding military capabilities have prompted a shift in European perspectives. The EU and several member states have developed “Indo-Pacific” strategies to enhance cooperation with regional countries. Brussels has also increased diplomatic support for the Philippines, issuing supportive statements following maritime altercations. In 2021, the EU appointed a special envoy for the Indo-Pacific, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited Manila in July 2023, the first visit by a Commission President, to express the EU’s readiness to enhance maritime security cooperation.

Background on the ECS Claim

The process of filing a claim before the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) involves several critical steps. Initially, a coastal state conducts comprehensive scientific and technical studies to delineate the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its baselines. These studies rely on geological, geomorphological, and geophysical data. Upon completion of these studies, the state prepares a detailed submission, which includes charts and coordinates, for review by the CLCS. The commission then examines the data, may request additional information, and, if the submission meets the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) requirements, provides recommendations. These recommendations form the basis for the coastal state’s establishment of the outer limits of its continental shelf, which are final and binding.

As the world’s coastal states divide up the ocean floor, the CLCS’s work becomes increasingly vital. The “Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Law and Legitimacy” examines the Commission from two perspectives: a legal examination of its decision-making process and a study of its normative legitimacy. The CLCS exists to facilitate the implementation of UNCLOS in establishing the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. Under UNCLOS, a coastal state must set the outer boundaries of its continental shelf where it exceeds 200 nautical miles, based on the Commission’s advice. The Commission offers recommendations to coastal states on creating such limits. However, its recommendations and actions do not affect the delimitation of boundaries between states with opposite or adjacent coasts.

Territorial and maritime sovereignty

There are two major points of contention: territorial sovereignty and maritime sovereignty. Territorial sovereignty conflicts concern claims of lawful possession of the territory itself, often relying on historical presence to determine rightful control. Maritime boundary conflicts pertain to the territorial delimitations permitted by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

UNCLOS established a 12-nautical-mile territorial sovereignty limit from a country’s coastline and a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that covers seabed resources within that sphere from the shoreline. This is significant because the country with authority over the islands also controls the natural resources in the surrounding area. In the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS) territorial disputes, there have been no fundamental resolutions of territorial sovereignty or marine boundary delimitations acceptable to all parties involved. Competing sovereignty claims stem from fundamentally different views on historical ownership rights, making convergence and reconciliation difficult to achieve.

The potentially rich natural resources in the claimed EEZs are central to the territorial disputes. Regarding maritime delimitation, scholars like Mark J. Valencia and Unryu Suganuma have noted that joint resource development can help build cooperative frameworks between the claimants, potentially leading to a more institutionalized method of energy resource distribution in the long run. Advancing resource cooperation in areas where China does not have administrative control over some disputed islands (such as the Spratly Islands and Senkaku Diaoyu Islands) can be a practical way to progress without acknowledging the other party’s sovereignty claims. Deng Xiaoping considered the “shelving” policy of collaboration as realistic for mutual economic gains while not jeopardizing China’s sovereignty claims. In the Senkaku Diaoyu conflict, there has been some progress in bilateral resource development, including a fisheries deal in 1997 and an agreement to develop the Shirakaba Chunxiao oil field in 2008. Long-term cooperative development activities are likely to be the most realistic and beneficial for creating trust and promoting positive-sum gains. Southeast Asian countries will likely choose regional security cooperation from powers like the United States and Japan in the foreseeable future. Establishing trust and providing comfort in bilateral interactions, both verbally and in action, will be critical in breaking the “suspicion begetting suspicion” and “fear begetting fear” cycles. Formalizing collaborative development frameworks will be essential for the SCS and ECS islands due to their geopolitical significance and will be a crucial determinant of future cooperation.

Securing maritime entitlements and resources through this process is highly significant for coastal states. It allows to exercise sovereign rights over the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil, including valuable hydrocarbons, minerals, and biological resources. Establishing clear maritime boundaries also helps prevent conflicts with neighboring states and ensures that the coastal state can manage and exploit its marine resources sustainably. Furthermore, it strengthens the state’s legal and political standing in asserting its maritime claims, contributing to regional stability and fostering economic development.

Article 76 of UNCLOS provides the legal basis for coastal states to establish the outer limits of their continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from their baselines. According to this article, a coastal state can extend its continental shelf if it meets specific geological criteria, including the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin or a distance of up to 350 nautical miles from the baselines or 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 meter isobath, whichever is greater. Coastal states must submit scientific and technical data to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) for validation.

The 2016 Arbitral Award, issued by the Permanent Court of Arbitration under UNCLOS, affirmed the Philippines’ maritime entitlements in the South China Sea. The tribunal ruled that China’s claims based on the “nine-dash line” had no legal basis under UNCLOS and clarified the entitlements of the Philippines within its EEZ and continental shelf. This award strengthens the Philippines’ legal standing and supports its claims for an extended continental shelf under UNCLOS provisions.

China Rejects Philippines’ Attempt to Extend Continental Shelf in South China Sea

China has rejected the Philippines’ request to seek UN approval for extending its continental shelf in the South China Sea, aiming to secure “exclusive” rights to exploit underwater resources. “The Philippines unilaterally submitted a case regarding the delimitation of the outer continental shelf in the South China Sea, infringing upon China’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction,” said China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian.

Beijing claims a vast ocean territory under its “nine-dash line,” which extends hundreds of miles south and east from Hainan Province. However, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled in 2016 that this claim has no legal basis under international law. Despite this ruling, China has rejected the verdict and has been in talks with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since 2002 to establish a code of conduct in the contested sea.

The Philippines submitted a request to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to determine the extent of its underwater continental shelf in the West Palawan Region facing the South China Sea. “The seabed and subsoil extending from our archipelago up to the maximum extent allowed by UNCLOS hold significant potential resources that will benefit our nation and people for generations to come,” said Philippine Foreign Assistant Secretary Marshall Louis Alferez. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) grants a coastal state exclusive rights to utilize natural resources on the continental shelf. Beijing strongly opposes the Philippines’ move, urging the panel not to investigate Manila’s submission as it covers disputed maritime space.

China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated that the commission should not evaluate or qualify the Philippines’ proposal if it includes the delimitation of disputed waters, following CLCS’s norms of procedure. Lin indicated that Beijing is still gathering information, but views Manila’s “unilateral submission” as a violation of China’s sovereign rights. Maritime affairs experts agree, predicting that Manila’s petition is unlikely to succeed and that Beijing will perceive the move as a legal challenge exacerbating South China Sea tensions. “It seems unlikely that CLCS will be able to validate any such claim. the Commission has, as a rule, avoided making any delimitation decisions when there are outstanding jurisdictional or sovereignty disputes,” said Isaac Kardon, senior fellow for China studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Beijing would see the claim as “another legal and political challenge from Manila,” similar to the 2016 arbitration, and as an attempt to undermine China’s broad claims through a UN institutional approach, he added.

China’s Foreign Ministry said it is still gathering information regarding Manila’s “unilateral submission” of an enlarged continental shelf. Mainland China claims nearly the entire South China Sea, which includes territory claimed by the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam. While the specifics of Manila’s submission had not yet been made public, its continental shelf claims might overlap with those of other coastal governments in the South China Sea, potentially leading other claimant states to use similar techniques. “The Philippines’ submission could set a precedent for other claimant states, who may file similar ECS (extended continental shelf) submissions to assert their rights,” said Ding Duo, associate research fellow at Hainan’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies. He noted that claimant countries might file their applications alone or together, adding that either scenario would complicate the South China Sea conflicts.

“This will make the dispute even more complex and harder to resolve, and introduces a new point of contention for how Beijing and Manila should properly manage and handle their differences in the South China Sea,” Ding told the press.

Maritime observers believed that Beijing would respond to Manila with harsh operational and diplomatic actions. “China might also increase the intensity of their interdictions at Second Thomas Shoal or escalate elsewhere in the South China Sea against Philippine interests,” Carnegie’s Kardon said, adding that China might choose to publish baselines around the Spratlys to challenge the Philippines’ claims. Baselines are essential in determining marine boundaries and exerting control over resources since they serve as the starting point for measuring a country’s territorial sea, EEZ, and continental shelf.

The Philippines Dilemma: How to manage tensions in the SCS?

The Philippines is a significant actor in the South China Sea territorial disputes, which are intensifying as China asserts itself and claimant governments compete for resources. Rather than using international law to counter China’s claims, President Rodrigo Duterte has taken a pragmatic approach, avoiding confrontation in hopes of reaping economic benefits. However, five years later, it appears this strategy has not fully paid off. The simmering maritime dispute between Manila and Beijing has become more entangled with geopolitical competition between China and the United States and its allies. Given the increased potential for escalating events at sea, Manila should advocate for a substantive and effective Code of Conduct between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to control maritime tensions while maintaining diplomatic channels with Beijing to avoid misunderstandings. Additionally, promoting regional collaboration, such as in fisheries management, would be beneficial.

Duterte, eager to reduce ties with the United States and extend his strategic options, has minimized the question of territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea during his administration, focusing instead on economic gains from China. In line with this strategy, he downplayed Manila’s victory in a 2016 arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which rejected Beijing’s wide claims of sovereignty and “historic rights” over the sea. Since then, Manila has maintained a flexible policy, often viewed as erratic by local and international observers, with the goal of strengthening connections with Beijing to promote economic growth. By advancing cautiously, the Philippines wanted to prevent the maritime issue from jeopardizing its bilateral relationship. However, five years into Duterte’s administration, problems persist.

Chinese ships patrol the Philippine exclusive economic zone without interruption, and Filipino vessels are frequently unable to reach traditional fishing grounds near Scarborough Shoal due to Chinese harassment. Many Filipinos are growing suspicious of rapprochement with China if it means giving up claims to contested sea features. Since late 2019, Manila has shown less willingness to ignore Beijing’s aggression in the South China Sea, submitting diplomatic protest notes to China in reaction to purported territorial transgressions.

More importantly, Duterte reversed his abrupt February 2020 revocation of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States, which permits the US to deploy military personnel in the Philippines and undertake joint exercises with Manila. In June 2020, Duterte suspended the cancellation. The United States then began referring to China’s claims in the South China Sea as “illegal,” reaffirmed its alliance with the Philippines, and stated that the Mutual Defense Treaty covers attacks on Philippine forces or vessels in the Sea. A confrontation in March 2021 over Whitsun Reef in the disputed Spratly Islands, involving hundreds of Chinese ships, further inflamed anti-China sentiment in the Philippines and strained relations. On July 30, 2021, Duterte formally reinstated the Visiting Forces Agreement.

Balancing a treaty relationship with the United States with periodic conflicts with neighbors, including a rising great power like China, is particularly challenging. Manila is allied with Washington through a longstanding relationship, but geographical and economic realities necessitate a compromise with Beijing. Simultaneously, Internal conflicts within the bureaucratic establishment and military, along with the interaction of elite interests and public opinion, often lead to apparent inconsistencies in government policy. To manage tensions and reduce the risk of maritime incidents escalating into conflict, the Philippines should bolster risk management measures and advocate for regional security cooperation.

Conclusion

The South China Sea disputes are complex, involving multiple countries and a range of economic, strategic, and security considerations, with phases of escalation and quiet. Recent tensions are increasingly tied to US-China strategic competition, complicating Manila’s foreign policy. Following Duterte’s 2016 election victory, the Philippines pivoted towards China, but opinions are mixed on whether this approach has served national interests, especially given Duterte’s ad hoc methods. If the next president adopts a less pro-China stance, more incidents at sea are likely post-Duterte. However, as the Whitsun Reef incident showed, Manila can manage Beijing with cooperation and deterrence. Manila’s long-term strength may lie in separating disputes from broader China relations and standing firm when necessary. The key concern is whether the Philippines can navigate between China and the US without choosing sides in a conflict. While Manila is currently hedging effectively, rising regional tensions may make this balance unsustainable. (MEHRAAN BHAI YEH CROP KR DAIN HIGHLIGHTED WALA )The deep waters of the South China Sea are expected to remain contentious, but finalizing a Code of Conduct and enhancing regional collaboration could help prevent future escalations. Success in extending its continental shelf at the International Court of Justice depends on strong scientific data, legal arguments, and cooperative dialogue with neighbouring states, adhering to international standards and fostering a collaborative spirit.

In an increasingly interconnected global landscape, regional conflicts reverberate far beyond their immediate theaters. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict has drawn significant attention and resources from Western powers, particularly the United States. Simultaneously, the Middle East simmers with volatility, with actors such as Israel, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis edging closer to war. In this turbulence, China sees opportunities to assert its dominance in the South China Sea (SCS), potentially destabilizing Southeast Asia and testing U.S. security commitments in the region.

The Middle Eastern Powder Keg

The Middle East, a region historically marked by geopolitical strife, finds itself at a critical crossroads. Since the surprise attack by Hamas on Israel on October 7, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has escalated dramatically. The situation is further complicated by the threat posed by Hezbollah in Lebanon, backed by Iran, to Israel’s northern settlements.

Meanwhile, the Houthis in Yemen, also backed by Iran, have disrupted maritime traffic in the Red Sea, adding another layer of complexity to the already volatile situation. With the prospect of war seeming imminent, Israel hopes for a swift victory through a blitzkrieg, but U.S. officials foresee a protracted conflict that could bog down the region and threaten long-term peace.

In light of these escalating tensions, the U.S. has offered significant assurances to Israel. Senior U.S. officials have reassured their Israeli counterparts that if a full-scale war breaks out on Israel’s northern border with Hezbollah, the Biden administration is fully prepared to back its ally. This assurance comes amidst increasing cross-border attacks between Israel and the Iran-backed Hezbollah, heightening fears of another full-fledged conflict in the Middle East.

However, U.S. officials have serious concerns that in the event of a full-blown war between Israel and Hezbollah, the Iran-backed militant group could overwhelm Israel’s air defenses in the north, including the Iron Dome system.

In recent meetings, U.S. and Israeli officials discussed potential “off-ramps” to de-escalate tensions along the Blue Line separating Lebanon and Israel.

The potential conflict in the Middle East also impacts U.S. strategic plans. While the U.S. has been attempting to pivot towards Asia, escalating tensions in the Middle East could hinder these efforts. The U.S. has been reshuffling its warship deployment in the region to maintain dominance, but a wider war in the Middle East could force the U.S. to focus more on this region, potentially affecting its strategic commitments elsewhere.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: A Preoccupation for the West

The conflict in Ukraine grinds on, marked by intense fighting as Ukrainian forces launch offensives to regain lost territory. Despite a recent peace summit in Switzerland, the path towards resolution remains daunting. The summit yielded a “Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework,” supported by a majority of attendees, pledging concrete steps on critical issues like nuclear threats, food security, and prisoner exchanges. However, Russia’s absence cast a long shadow, with its spokesman Dmitry Peskov dismissing the talks as irrelevant.

These developments highlight the conflict’s protracted nature and the difficulty of finding a solution without all parties at the table. The United States and its NATO allies have committed billions of dollars in aid and military support to Ukraine. As of mid-2024, the U.S. has provided over $40 billion in military assistance. This substantial investment indicates a preoccupation that might detract from the U.S.’s ability to respond robustly to crises elsewhere, particularly in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific region.

The South China Sea: A Brewing Storm

As the U.S. grapples with simultaneous conflicts in Ukraine and potentially the Middle East, China perceives a strategic window to advance its interests in the South China Sea. The sea is a crucial maritime route, vital for international trade and regional economies, particularly those of Southeast Asian nations like Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. China’s aggressive territorial claims and militarization of artificial islands have long been sources of regional tension.

Recently, China has ramped up its activities, including constructing military bases on disputed islands and increasing naval patrols. The U.S. has responded with freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) to assert the principle of international waters. However, with the U.S. potentially distracted, China might escalate its activities, pushing the boundaries of its influence and testing the resolve of Southeast Asian nations and their security alliances.

Implications for Southeast Asian Nations

The potential for increased Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS) poses significant risks for Southeast Asia. Economically, the region heavily relies on the stability of maritime routes for trade. Over $3.37 trillion worth of international trade passes through the SCS annually. Any disruption, such as those potentially caused by China’s growing assertiveness, could have cascading effects on global supply chains, impacting economies already strained by the pandemic.

Security-wise, Southeast Asian nations find themselves in an increasingly precarious position. The Philippines, a key U.S. ally, has experienced direct confrontations with Chinese vessels in its own Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In response to Chinese incursions, the Philippines has condemned China’s actions and asserted that such aggressive maneuvers will not prevent it from carrying out rotation and resupply missions to its troops in the West Philippine Sea. Philippine Former Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. called for stronger U.S. involvement back in 2021, stating, “We need the Americans. We need their presence in the South China Sea.” Today, the call for American presence in the South China Sea resonates even more powerfully, reflecting the escalating tension and the urgent need for stability in the region.

Moreover, China’s recent military exercises simulating an invasion of Taiwan have raised concerns about its intentions and the potential for escalation in the region. These exercises, which included mock missile strikes, have put Taiwan and other regional powers on high alert, highlighting the broader security implications of Chinese military assertiveness.

Similarly, Vietnam has fortified its own claims and sought closer security ties with the U.S. and other regional powers.  Its newly elected President To Lam is keen on gradually expanding security and defense relationships with the United States. The aim is to enhance collaboration in fields like cybersecurity, counter-terrorism, and combating transnational crimes. This move is a part of Vietnam’s strategic approach to maintain balanced relationships with the world’s major powers.

The web of alliances and rivalries in Southeast Asia means that any significant disruption in the South China Sea could lead to broader regional instability, with profound implications for both regional and global security.

U.S. Security Commitments: A Test of Resolve

The U.S. has long maintained a security presence in the Indo-Pacific, highlighted by its alliances with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and its strategic partnerships with nations like Singapore and Vietnam. However, the strain of managing conflicts on multiple fronts—Ukraine, potentially the Middle East, and then in the South China Sea—could test American resolve and capability.

The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, however, emphasizes a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” with commitments to deter aggression and maintain regional stability. Yet, a perceived or actual reduction in U.S. military presence and engagement in Southeast Asia could embolden China, altering the regional balance of power. Admiral John C. Aquilino, commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, has stressed the importance of maintaining U.S. presence, stating, “The security environment is becoming more complex, and we must be prepared to respond to threats in multiple theaters” .

The viewpoint of the U.S. public towards foreign interventions is a crucial factor. Recent polls indicate a growing reluctance among Americans towards military involvement abroad. If this sentiment continues to intensify, it could influence U.S. strategic considerations. The impact of this domestic pressure on the U.S.’s determination to uphold its security commitments in the Indo-Pacific and the Arab world remains to be seen.

 China’s Strategic Calculus

China is likely to perceive the U.S.’s preoccupation with other global conflicts as an opportune moment to consolidate its position in the SCS. Beijing has historically sought to avoid direct military confrontation with the U.S., opting instead for incremental gains through strategic maneuvers. Should the U.S. appear overstretched, China might intensify its activities in the SCS, including more aggressive patrolling, establishing further military outposts, and pressuring Southeast Asian nations diplomatically and economically.

Yan Xuetong, a prominent Chinese scholar of international relations, asserts that China’s strategy aims to secure regional dominance and protect maritime interests. He advocates for enhancing “comprehensive national power” through a balanced approach: strengthening control over the SCS while avoiding direct conflict with the U.S. This strategy combines military readiness with diplomatic engagement to manage tensions without provoking a full-scale confrontation.

Diplomatic engagement plays a crucial role in China’s strategy. Beijing seeks to divide and weaken the unified stance of ASEAN countries by offering economic incentives to some while isolating more vocal opponents like Vietnam and the Philippines. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) exemplifies this, as Beijing leverages economic investments to expand its influence across Southeast Asia. Nations such as Cambodia and Laos, heavily reliant on Chinese investments, might find it challenging to oppose Chinese ambitions in the SCS. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian has reiterated China’s stance, asserting, “China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and their adjacent waters”.

China’s diplomatic efforts are complemented by its participation in regional forums and international organizations, where it aims to shape the narrative and build support for its claims. This multifaceted approach allows China to advance its strategic objectives while managing the risks of direct confrontation. As the U.S. navigates conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, China’s opportunity to consolidate SCS claims heightens, reshaping Southeast Asia’s geopolitical dynamics.

End Note

The web of global geopolitics suggests that a wider conflict in the Middle East would have profound implications beyond its immediate vicinity, potentially destabilizing Southeast Asia and altering the strategic dynamics of the South China Sea. For Southeast Asian nations, the challenge lies in understanding this complex landscape, balancing their security needs with economic realities. For the U.S., maintaining its security commitments in the Indo-Pacific while addressing crises elsewhere will be a formidable test of its global leadership and strategic resilience. As the world watches developments in the Middle East, the stakes for Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region cannot be overstated.

Japan is engaging in a significant strategic endeavor: constructing artificial islands. This island nation, long shaped by the tectonic forces at the convergent plate boundary, is now using human ingenuity to enhance its geopolitical and economic standing. The move is not just about expanding territory but also about fortifying its position in a region rife with tension and uncertainty.

Historical Relationship Between China, Taiwan, and Japan

The complex relationship between China (officially the People’s Republic of China, PRC) and Taiwan (officially the Republic of China, ROC) is central to understanding the broader regional dynamics. Following Japan’s defeat in World War II, Taiwan was transferred from Japanese control to the Republic of China in 1945. This handover was formalized under the Treaty of San Francisco, although some legal ambiguities regarding the treaty’s wording persist.

The Chinese Civil War, which saw the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) defeat the Kuomintang (KMT) forces, resulted in the ROC government retreating to Taiwan in 1949. This established Taipei as the ROC’s temporary capital, while Beijing became the capital of the newly founded People’s Republic of China. Since then, no formal peace treaty has been signed, leaving the civil war technically unresolved.

Early cross-strait relations were marked by military skirmishes and diplomatic battles as both governments claimed to be the legitimate ruler of China. The situation began to evolve following Taiwan’s democratization in the 1990s. Today, the debate centers on whether Taiwan should pursue formal independence or seek unification with the PRC under a “one country, two systems” framework. Beijing continues to claim Taiwan as part of its territory and vehemently opposes any moves toward Taiwanese independence.

In 2008, talks resumed to reopen the “Three Links”—trade, transit, and postal services—that had been severed since 1949. This period also saw increased non-governmental and semi-governmental interactions between Taipei and Beijing, although formal diplomatic exchanges remain contentious and largely dependent on the political party in power in Taiwan.

Shifting gears, now let’s turn to Japan. Understanding Japan’s historical relationship with Taiwan and its current strategic interests in the region is crucial to comprehending why Japan is actively building islands, particularly near Taiwan.

Japan’s historical ties with Taiwan date back to the 16th century. In 1592, during the Sengoku period, Japanese warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi sent an envoy to Taiwan, then known as Takasago Koku. The bilateral economic ties persisted through Dutch colonial rule and the Tungning Kingdom of Taiwan in the 17th century. Japan’s Meiji Restoration in the late 19th century reignited its expansionist ambitions, culminating in Taiwan becoming a Japanese colony in 1895 after the First Sino-Japanese War. This colonial period ended with Japan’s defeat in World War II and Taiwan’s return to Chinese control.

Despite the end of official diplomatic relations following the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué, which recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China, Taiwan and Japan maintain robust non-governmental interactions. These include significant economic and cultural exchanges, reflecting a complicated yet enduring relationship.

Geopolitical Significance of Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region

Taiwan’s strategic location in the Indo-Pacific makes it a pivotal player in regional geopolitics. The island nation sits at the crossroads of the South China Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the Indian Ocean. This advantageous position has made Taiwan a focal point in the power dynamics between the US and China, particularly as Beijing intensifies its military activities and aggressive rhetoric towards the island.

The Indo-Pacific region has become the center of global strategic interest, with major powers like China, the US, Japan, Australia, and India vying for influence. China’s assertive territorial claims in the East and South China Seas have led to numerous disputes with neighboring countries, including Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan. These tensions have prompted other regional powers to bolster their presence and support stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Taiwan’s strategic significance is further underscored by its role in global supply chains, particularly in semiconductor manufacturing. The island is home to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world’s largest contract chipmaker. In 2022, TSMC and other Taiwanese firms accounted for over 60% of global semiconductor production, supplying essential components for everything from smartphones to advanced military systems. This dominance has made Taiwan a crucial player in the global tech industry and a key partner for the US and other advanced economies.

The US has taken significant steps to reduce its dependency on Taiwanese semiconductors, recognizing the strategic risks involved. The CHIPS Act, passed in 2022, aims to bolster domestic chip production, including financial support for TSMC’s new facility in Arizona, set to begin operations in 2025. Concurrently, the Biden administration has imposed strict export controls to limit China’s access to advanced semiconductors, further escalating the technological competition between Washington and Beijing.

Recent Tensions Between China and Taiwan

Despite escalating tensions, Taiwan remains a global leader in semiconductor manufacturing, producing over 60% of the world’s semiconductors in 2022. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) plays a pivotal role in this industry, supplying critical components to major tech firms like Apple. This dominance in chip manufacturing has drawn the attention of global powers, with the US seeking to bolster its own semiconductor industry in response to its reliance on Taiwanese production.

The growing hostilities between China and Taiwan have profound implications for global economies and supply chains. The Biden administration’s efforts to restrict China’s access to advanced chips, coupled with support for TSMC’s expansion in the US, highlight the strategic importance of securing semiconductor supply chains amid growing tensions with China.

China’s aggressive tactics towards Taiwan have included economic pressure and military intimidation, particularly since the election of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leader Tsai Ing-Wen as president in 2016. Beijing’s assertiveness was further underscored by President Xi Jinping’s announcement on October 8, 2021, of China’s potential “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan. This statement came on the heels of a record number of Chinese military aircraft entering Taiwan’s defense zone.

The geopolitical significance of Taiwan is also reflected in its advanced defense capabilities. Taiwan’s deep-water naval bases on the east coast, such as Su’ao and Hualien, allow submarines to enter the Pacific Ocean undetected, highlighting the island’s strategic value to Beijing. The heightened activity of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) around Taiwan underscores China’s commitment to reunification, with military maneuvers increasingly testing Taiwan’s defenses.

In 2024, Lai Ching-te, also known as William Lai, is set to assume the presidency of Taiwan, continuing the DPP’s governance for a third consecutive term. This unprecedented political continuity signifies strong public support for Taiwan’s current trajectory, despite the ongoing threats from Beijing. The international community closely watches these developments, considering the implications for regional stability and global geopolitical dynamics.

Japan’s Concerns and Strategic Interests

Japan, while not a direct participant in the South China Sea disputes, has significant interests in maintaining stability in the region. The South China Sea is a critical corridor for global trade, and any disruption could have severe economic repercussions for Japan. Furthermore, Japan faces direct security threats from North Korea’s missile program and its territorial disputes with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

Japan’s approach to the South China Sea issue is heavily influenced by its security alliance with the United States. This alliance, while providing a strategic buffer, also subjects Japan to the vicissitudes of US foreign policy. Tokyo’s challenge is to balance its dependency on US military support with its need to assert its own strategic interests in the region.

For Japan, maintaining a balance of power in this region is crucial to its national security and economic stability. Japan’s construction of artificial islands can therefore be viewed as a strategic move to bolster its maritime presence and secure its interests in the Indo-Pacific. These islands serve multiple purposes, from enhancing military capabilities to securing vital sea lanes and supporting economic activities.

Japan’s regional strategy also involves deepening ties with other key players in the Indo-Pacific, including Australia, India, and Southeast Asian nations. These partnerships are crucial for Japan to build a coalition that can effectively counterbalance China’s growing assertiveness. Japan’s efforts to align its Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision with ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific Outlook demonstrate its commitment to regional diplomacy and multilateral cooperation. This initiative reflects Japan’s proactive approach to addressing the geopolitical challenges of the 21st century.

The Evolving Defense Posture of Japan’s Nansei Islands

A significant shift in defense strategy emerged during the recent “2-plus-2” negotiations between the foreign and defense ministers of Japan and the United States. Held in Washington, this summit marked a pivotal moment in fortifying the defense of Japan’s Nansei Islands, highlighting the growing concerns over potential threats from China and the vulnerability of Taiwan.

The New Marine Littoral Regiment

Okinawa Prefecture is set to host a U.S. Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), a unit specially designed to rapidly respond to emergencies on Japan’s outlying islands. This decision reflects the increasing anxiety over Taiwan’s security. The MLR, expected to be operational by 2025, will consist of approximately 1,800 to 2,000 troops equipped with anti-aircraft missiles and long-range anti-ship capabilities. This regiment will be highly maneuverable, capable of dispersing into smaller units to defend isolated islands, disrupt enemy operations, and control nearby waters.

Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada emphasized the importance of enhancing the alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities. “This effort will significantly strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities,” he declared at a joint press conference. “We came to the conclusion that, in order to assume the fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s defense capabilities, a division of roles and missions must be realized.”

The transformation of the Marine Corps regiment in Okinawa is a key element of this strategy. This change is part of a broader realignment that includes reducing heavy equipment to create a more agile force. The first MLR was established in Hawaii in March 2022, with plans for a third regiment likely to be stationed in Guam. This positioning is crucial given China’s “anti-access/area-denial” strategy, which aims to restrict U.S. forces’ access to critical regions in the western Pacific.

Enhancing Japan’s Self-Defense Forces

Parallel to these developments, Japan is enhancing its own Self-Defense Forces (SDF). The Ground Self-Defense Force’s 15th Brigade in Naha is slated to expand into a division, increasing its personnel from approximately 2,200 to 3,000. This upgrade is part of the Defense Buildup Program, which aims to make eight divisions, five brigades, and other units more mobile and capable of quick deployment to the Nansei Islands.

Transport and logistics are also being prioritized. Plans include forming a transport ship unit and increasing the number of aircraft and transport ships. Additionally, the government is advancing the construction of supply bases and weapon storage facilities in the Nansei region, a move that the U.S. military has long advocated to ensure a robust supply chain for continuous SDF operations.

Community Impact and Local Concerns

Amid these strategic preparations, local communities, particularly on Yonaguni Island, are grappling with the implications. Known for its idyllic beaches and unique wildlife, Yonaguni is now at the forefront of regional tensions due to its proximity to Taiwan, only 110 kilometers away. The Japanese government has announced plans to expand the island’s airport and port, as well as the SDF facilities. In April, it was also declared that underground shelters would be constructed for evacuees on Yonaguni and other frontline islands.

Residents like Shoko Komine, who runs a local restaurant, express their concerns about being drawn into a potential conflict. “Of course I’m worried about something happening with Taiwan,” she says. “I believe Yonaguni may be drawn into a dispute with China and Taiwan if it arises.”

Constructing Underground Shelters

In response to these concerns, the government released guidelines for constructing subterranean bunkers on Okinawa Prefecture’s outlying islands. These shelters, to be built in public facilities, are designed to protect residents during a Taiwan-related military conflict. They will be equipped with reinforced concrete walls and stocked with supplies sufficient for at least two weeks. However, the mayors of some isolated islands have voiced their dissatisfaction, fearing that these preparations might increase the likelihood of their communities being targeted in the event of Chinese aggression.

Okinawa Governor Denny Tamaki has called for diplomatic measures to ensure peace, reflecting on the devastating toll of the Battle of Okinawa in 1945. “I want to ask the central government for an explanation about how it plans to take steps to ensure peace, rather than just work on the assumption that bases and underground shelters should come first,” Tamaki stated.

Balancing Preparedness and Diplomacy

Japan’s strategy underscores a delicate balance between preparedness and diplomacy. The construction of underground shelters on islands like Ishigaki, Miyakojima, Yonaguni, Taketomi, and Tarama is part of a comprehensive approach to safeguarding citizens and maintaining regional stability. These shelters are designed not only for military crises but also to serve as evacuation centers during natural disasters and as community spaces in peacetime.

Experts like Ken Jimbo, an international security professor at Tokyo’s Keio University, support the government’s strategy. He highlights the increasing awareness of a potential military clash over Taiwan. However, Jimbo also cautions that crisis management plans must consider the severe impact a full-scale Chinese invasion of Taiwan would have.

End Note

Japan’s proactive approach reflects its commitment to integrating emergency infrastructure into daily life, thereby strengthening community resilience. By balancing defense measures with diplomatic efforts, Japan aims to deter aggression while promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region. This comprehensive strategy not only enhances the protection of its citizens but also underscores Japan’s dedication to harmonious international relations.